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Limits of Constitutional law: Constitutional law does not extend its provisions to infringements of an individual's legal right by another individual

 In Sapura Mohd Noh v. Sentosa Medical Centre Sdn Bhd & Anor [2026] MLRHU 655, the High Court observed as follows:

 

“[35] In Beatrice AT Fernandez v. Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor [2005] 1 MELR 1; [2005] 1 MLRA 320; [2005] 3 MLJ 681; [2005] 2 CLJ 713; [2005] 4 AMR 1, the Federal Court reaffirmed that causes of action based on violation of constitutional rights could arise only if the 'violating party' is the Legislature or the Executive or its agencies, ie has statutory authority and wields statutory powers. Since the Respondents in this appeal are just two private limited companies with neither statutory authority nor powers, the Appellant's cause of action (if any has arisen) could only have been based on the Employment Contract, ie of a contractual nature, or based on an alleged tort. The relevant passage in the judgment of Abdul Malek Ahmad PCA (as he then was) reads as follows: "To invoke art 8 of the Federal Constitution, the applicant must show that some law or action of the Executive discriminates against her so as to controvert her rights under the said Article. Constitutional law, as a branch of public law, deals with the contravention of individual rights by the Legislature or the Executive or its agencies. Constitutional law does not extend its substantive or procedural provisions to infringements of an individual's legal right by another individual."...”





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