S.S. Tieh's Malaysian Law Updates

There are 4 conditions to be satisfied in an application for direct payment from an employer per Section 30 of the Construction Industry Payment And Adjudication Act 2012. In TRI PACIFIC ENGINEERING SDN BHD v. KL ECO CITY SDN BHD [2026] MLRAU 110 , the Court of Appeal held that:   “[22] It has been widely accepted that the case of Cabnet Systems (M) Sdn Bhd v. Dekad Kaliber Sdn Bhd & Anor [2020] 3 MLRH 83; [2020] 3 AMR 257 has laid down the conditions which must be fulfilled for an application under sec 30 CIPAA to be satisfied. In that case Wong Kian Kheong J (now JCA) had held, "[29] I am of the following view regarding the application of s 30 CIPAA: (1) a party (X) who has obtained an adjudication decision against another party (Y), may claim for the adjudicated amount from Y's principal (Z) if the following four conditions are satisfied (4 Conditions)- (a) Y has failed to pay the adjudicated amount to X [please see s 30(1) and (3)CIPAA] (1st Condition); (b) X has ...

  In Sapura Mohd Noh v. Sentosa Medical Centre Sdn Bhd & Anor [2026] MLRHU 655 , the High Court observed as follows:   “[35] In Beatrice AT Fernandez v. Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor [2005] 1 MELR 1; [2005] 1 MLRA 320; [2005] 3 MLJ 681; [2005] 2 CLJ 713; [2005] 4 AMR 1, the Federal Court reaffirmed that causes of action based on violation of constitutional rights could arise only if the 'violating party' is the Legislature or the Executive or its agencies, ie has statutory authority and wields statutory powers. Since the Respondents in this appeal are just two private limited companies with neither statutory authority nor powers, the Appellant's cause of action (if any has arisen) could only have been based on the Employment Contract, ie of a contractual nature, or based on an alleged tort. The relevant passage in the judgment of Abdul Malek Ahmad PCA (as he then was) reads as follows: "To invoke art 8 of the Federal Constitution, the applicant must s...

In Pendakwa Raya v Pang Kar Foong [2026] 4 MLRA 23 , the Court of Appeal observed as follows:   “[30] Berhubung sama ada YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah khilaf apabila mempertimbangkan pembelaan perbuatan seseorang yang tidak sempurna akal di bawah s 84 Kanun Keseksaan di akhir kes pendakwaan sedangkan undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa pertimbangan sedemikian hanya boleh dilakukan di akhir kes pembelaan, Mahkamah ini kini terikat dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes PP v. Mohd Rozani Yahaya [2025] 1 MLRA 203 yang telah mengakas keputusan Mahkamah ini. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam alasannya telah dengan jelas memutuskan sebagaimana berikut :   “[67] Secondly, after having found that the prosecution had established a prima facie case as charged, it is incumbent for the learned trial Judge to call for the accused to enter his defence. It is premature for the learned trial to acquit the accused at the end of the prosecution’s case based solely on medical ev...

The answer is “No”.   The Court of Appeal in Duta Nilai Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Ismail Othman & Ors [2026] 4 MLRA 1 held that:   “[59] The Appellant’s case rests on the proposition that an unopposed expert’s opinion must be accepted. With respect, that is not an absolute rule: a trial judge may reject or limit the weight of expert evidence if the expert’s scope, methodology, assumptions or concessions undermine reliability .   [60] It is well settled that expert evidence is advisory in nature and does not bind the Court. Section 45 of the Evidence Act 1950 permits expert opinion to assist the court in matters requiring specialised knowledge, but the responsibility for assessing such evidence and arriving at findings of fact remains with the Court . The Court of Appeal in Kulasingam Samuel v. Rasammah JV Thambipillai [1996] 2 MLRA 97 observed that “expert witnesses only give opinion evidence, but the court is free to draw its own conclusions.” ...   ...

Maintenance fees and contribution to the sinking fund which have remained unpaid during a developer’s management period, shall vest in the joint management body on the date of the expiry of the said developer’s management period.   Section 16(2) of the Strata Management Act 2013 provides that:   “ (2) Any right, power or remedy granted to the developer under this Part in respect of the Charges, contribution to the sinking fund, and any other assets of the maintenance account and the sinking fund account, shall vest in the joint management body on the date of the expiry of the developer’s management period, and the joint management body shall have the same right, power or remedy as if it had at all times been a right, power or remedy of the joint management body, including those rights in respect of any legal proceedings or applications to any authority by the developer pending immediately before the expiry of the developer’s management period.”

The exercise of prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney-General is not immunised from civil actions. The Court of Appeal in Mohammad Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak v Thomas Thomas @ Mohan a/l K Thomas [2026] MLJU 829 held that: “[52] For my part, I agree with the views expressed in the trio of cases that I discussed above. At the risk of repetition, I note that whilst art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution grants prosecutorial discretion to the Attorney General, it does not immunize the wrongful exercise of it from civil actions. Neither does any other written law provide such protection to the Attorney General . Furthermore, in all the cases in the law reports where the Attorney General or Deputy Public Prosecutors have been sued for malicious prosecution, save in the instant case in the court below and in the Nik Suhaimi case that was decided by the same High Court Judge, no court has said that said tort cannot be availed in a civil action because the prosecutorial discretio...