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CRIMINAL LAW: After having found prosecution has established a prima facie case, trial Judge has to call accused to enter his defence

In Pendakwa Raya v Pang Kar Foong [2026] 4 MLRA 23, the Court of Appeal observed as follows:

 

“[30] Berhubung sama ada YA Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah khilaf apabila mempertimbangkan pembelaan perbuatan seseorang yang tidak sempurna akal di bawah s 84 Kanun Keseksaan di akhir kes pendakwaan sedangkan undang-undang adalah mantap bahawa pertimbangan sedemikian hanya boleh dilakukan di akhir kes pembelaan, Mahkamah ini kini terikat dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes PP v. Mohd Rozani Yahaya [2025] 1 MLRA 203 yang telah mengakas keputusan Mahkamah ini. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam alasannya telah dengan jelas memutuskan sebagaimana berikut:

 

“[67] Secondly, after having found that the prosecution had established a prima facie case as charged, it is incumbent for the learned trial Judge to call for the accused to enter his defence. It is premature for the learned trial to acquit the accused at the end of the prosecution’s case based solely on medical evidence, as that is not a complete defence in law as envisaged under ss 84 or 85(2)(b) of the Penal Code. The learned trial Judge should have continued with the trial and heard the defence’s version. It is certainly premature for the learned trial Judge at the end of the prosecution’s case to determine whether or not the accused was of unsound mind when he committed the offence as the onus of proving the defence on a balance of probabilities was on the accused at the defence stage of the trial. Having found that the offence of murder had been established by the prosecution, it is incumbent upon the trial Judge to direct the accused to state his defence. By failing to do so, the learned trial Judge had fallen into a serious error of law, which was repeated by the Court of Appeal, which warranted appellate intervention.”...”

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