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STRATA MANAGEMENT: TRIBUNAL IS NOT A COURT

The Strata Management Tribunal is not a court within the context of Section 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 or Section 3(2) of the Subordinate Courts Act, but an inferior tribunal created by the Strata Management Act 2013.

 

The Court of Appeal in Yong Kein Sin & Anor v Perbadanan Pengurusan Springtide Residences and other appeals [2025] MLJU 1469 held at paragraph [31] of the judgment as follows:

 

“[31] We are of the view that an award of a SMT does not attract the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Our reasons are as follows:

(1)    once a “court’ has finally decided a case (1st Case), the decision in the 1st Case may affect subsequent cases in other “courts” by way of an application of the doctrine of res judicata -please refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court delivered by Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd  [1995] 3 MLJ 189, at 197 to 198, 198 and 199 to 200.

(2)    A SMT-

(a)    is not a “court’ as defined in s 3 CJA (a SMT is not the “Federal Court’, “Court of Appeal or “High Court’); and

(b)    is not a “Sessions Court’ or “Magistrate’s Court’ as understood in s 3(2)(a) and (b) SCA.

(3)    Section 120(2)(b) SMA provides that a SMT’s award “shall “be deemed to be an order of a court and be enforced accordingly by any party to the proceedings”. This provision merely states that for the purpose of the enforcement of a SMT’s award, the SMT’s award shall be deemed to be a court order and can be enforced as a court order. Section 120(2)(b) SMA does not confer the status of a “court’ on a SMT;

(4)    a SMT is an inferior tribunal created by s 102 SMA with limited jurisdiction according to s 105(1) and (3) SMA. Notwithstanding the fact that s 120(1)(a) SMA provides that an award of a SMT “shall “be final and binding on all parties to the proceedings”, an award of a SMT may nevertheless be challenged in the High Court as follows -

(a)    by virtue of s 121(1) to (3) SMA, a party who is aggrieved by the SMT’s award may apply to the High Court under s 121 SMA to “challenge” the SMT’s award; or

(b)    a party who is adversely affected by an award of SMT may file a Judicial Review application in the High Court pursuant to O 53 RC;

(5)    in this case, the SMT had not decided the claim in the SMT on its merits - please refer to the above paragraph 27. The res judicata doctrine is an equitable concept based on case law and should not be applied indiscriminately so as to cause an injustice or inequity - please see the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in the Court of Appeal case of Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd  [2001] 4 MLJ 346, at 356, 357 and 358. If we have applied the res judicata doctrine in the 1st and 2nd Appeals, this will occasion a grave injustice to the Appellants (1st Appeal) and Appellants (2nd Appeal) because the SMT did not decide on the merits of the claim in the SMT; and

(6)    in any event, as explained in paragraphs 42 and 53 below, the By-Law (MC’s Indemnity) and MC’s Different Rates are invalid premised on ss 70(2) SMA and 60(3)(b) SMA respectively. The res judicata doctrine which is based on case law cannot estop the application of statutory provisions in ss 60(3)(b) and 70(2) SMA - please refer to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Sabah Development Bank Bhd v TYL Land & Development Sdn Bhd  [2024] 6 MLJ 433, at [46].

(7)    With respect, the learned High Court Judge did not consider the above reasons regarding why the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied based on an award of a SMT.”

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