Ong Thye Peng v Loo Choo Teng & 7 Ors  1 AMR 757 [FC]
Section 60 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1959 ("the Act") is concerned with the manner of disposal of the property of a deceased person by his personal representative. An executor is a trustee of the property of the beneficiaries just as an administrator is. Their duty was to ensure that the estate, of which they are trustees, benefits as much as possible when they deal with trust property. Thus, the obligation of executors and administrators towards the estate of which they are personal representatives must be the same because their primary duty was to protect the rights and interests of the beneficiaries. There can therefore be no difference in the duty of administrators and executors in the sale of estate property.
It followed that even in the case of a sale of property by an executor, the relevant date to determine whether the price for the property is fair is not at the time of the offer but at the time of the hearing of the application for approval of the proposed sale.
The Co-operative Central Bank Limited v KGV & Associates Sdn Bhd  1 AMR 789 [FC]
There was no duty of care owed by a registered valuer of a property to a financier (akin to a professional who ought not on policy grounds to be held to owe a duty to persons unknown).
See Teow Guan & 12 Ors v Liquidators of Kian Joo Holdings Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) & 3 Ors  1 AMR 811 [COA]
It is quite established that an injunction for the preservation of property and other mandatory orders may only be granted in accordance with the principles applicable to the granting of interlocutory injunctions. It may be granted where the court is satisfied that there is a substantial question to be tried, and a case has been made out for the preservation of that property. And as in the American Cyanamid Co (No 1) v Ethicon Ltd  AC 396, smack on the issue of injunctions, there is the requirement that before a court exercises its discretion in favour of granting an injunction:-
(1) there must be a serious question to be tried;
(2) there must not be any delay by the appellants in making the application;
(3) that if the appellant were to succeed at the appeal, damages would not be adequate compensation for its loss;
(4) that the balance of convenience lies in its favour;
(5) the appellants must demonstrate evidence that its financial undertaking given to court is solid and worth powder and shot; and
(6) there are special circumstances in its favour including the justice of the case.
At this interlocutory stage, it is not the function of the court to resolve the issues on conflicting affidavit evidence, inclusive of difficult questions of law that require detailed argument or mature considerations.
Mere fear and sentimentality certainly do not qualify as persuasive grounds construable as special circumstances.
Chee Kuat Fong & 3 Ors v Lee Wai Yen  2 AMR 1 [COA]
Based on the judgment in Liew Yew Tiam & 3 Ors v Cheah Cheng Hoc & 2 Ors  2 AMR 2320, the trial court had erred in awarding separate awards for the joint tortfeasors, i.e., the defendants. However, the total amount awarded in relation to the libel by the learned judge was not outrageously exorbitant or shockingly excessive or even manifestly unreasonable, unjust or irrational. It was a fair and just compensation. In the circumstances, there should be no appellate interference.