Marina bte Mohd Yusoff v Pekeliling Triangle Sdn Bhd (receiver and manager appointed) (and 3 Other Appeals) [2008] 1 AMR 687 [COA]

Marina bte Mohd Yusoff ("MY"), as a shareholder, has no legal right to any item of property owned by Pekeliling Triangle Sdn Bhd ("PTSB") other than a share in the profits while the company continue to carry out business. PTSB as the registered proprietor has priority of interest on the property over MY who is only a shareholder.
By virtue of Sections 60 and 72 of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act, 1998 ("the Act"), the court is precluded from granting any injunction or other restraining orders against Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad ("the corporation") or Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd ("Danaharta Urus") (a subsidiary of the corporation).
Apart from the test whether there is a likelihood of a successful appeal being rendered nugatory, the principle governing the grant of an interlocutory injunction are equally applicable to the grant of an Erinford injunction. Any application of an Erinford injunction must involve considerations of the overall justice of the case and as to whether damages would be an adequate remedy.
The grant of an Erinford injunction by the learned high court judge fell foul of Section 72 of the Act as it had the effect of restraining the action taken or proposed to be taken by Danaharta Urus or its servants or agents over the assets.

Neoh Hong Sang (t/a Neoh Hong sang Contractor) v Lye Weng Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2008] 1 AMR 703 [COA]

It was clear from Nancy Ooi's affidavit that she was the secretary to one of the directors of the respondent and not the secretary of the respondent as claimed by the appellant. Thus, she had no authority to sign anything on behalf of the respondent, more so an agreement on behalf of the respondent. Further, from her affidavit, it was shown that she signed the document as a witness and not as the respondent's agent.
To allow or not to allow the application of striking out under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 on the ground of delay is a matter of discretion of the trial judge. In the absence of anything to show that the trial judge had exercised his discretion wrongly to the prejudice of another party, the appellate court would not interfere.

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