In the Court of Appeal case of Chin Chee Keong v Toling Corp (M) Sdn Bhd  3 MLJ 479, it was held that:-
" Having established the requirements for a claim under sub-s 304(1), the next issue is the standard of proof that is required for such a claim.
 The learned High Court judge found the plaintiff's case proved on a balance of probabilities, rejecting the first defendant's submission that a standard of beyond reasonable doubt for a case of fraud in civil proceedings was required as was decided by the Federal Court in Yong Tim v Hoo Kok Chong & Anor  3 CLJ 229. The judge chose instead to apply the lower degree of proof as established in Siow Yoon Keong v H Rosen Engineering BV  4 MLJ 569, and followed in a series of decisions such as Cyber Village Sdn Bhd v Illustra IT (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors  MLJU 1853;  4 CLJ 613; LMW Electronics Pte Ltd v Ang Chuang Juay & Ors  1 MLJ 185; Dato' Gan Ah Tee & Anor (in their capacity as liquidators of Par-Advance Sdn Bhd (in liquidation)) v Kuan Leo Choon & Ors  10 MLJ 706. It was the court's view that this was because sub-s 304(1) itself uses the terms 'if it appears'.
 Again, this point arose and was addressed in Aneka Melor Sdn Bhd v Seri Sabco (M) Sdn Bhd:
 Consequently, we agree with the learned High Court judge on the applicable standard of proof for a statutory claim under sub-s 304(1). Not so much because this is the standard under civil fraud but because sub-s 304(1) itself sets the standard of proof that must be met. The term if 'it appears' is deployed in the provision and this clearly indicates that a lower degree of proof is required. That lower degree of proof is on a balance of probabilities. It cannot go any lower than the civil burden of proof."
And, it was further held that:-
" It is the submissions of learned counsel for the defendants that sub-s 304(1) did not envisage the plaintiff maintaining two separate actions. It is counsel's submission that the wording of sub-s 304(1) required the evidence of fraudulent trading to be uncovered in the course of winding up proceedings or in any proceedings against the company and, the action taken against the defendants in those same proceedings.
 Hence, the use of the words 'the court' as opposed to 'a court'; and the words 'on the application of the liquidator or creditor or contributory of the company' as opposed to words such as 'suit' or 'fresh proceedings'. Learned counsel's point is that this deliberate use of these words meant that the intention of Parliament was that sub-s 304(1) claims are to be part of the winding up of a company or in any proceedings against a company. The court was urged to read the words 'in the course of' conjunctively and applicable to both instances of winding up proceedings as well as any proceedings against a company.
 In essence, the submission here is that the action against both the company and the defendants must be taken in the same single action. That action may be to wind-up of the company; or any other proceedings against the company. It is in the course of either of these proceedings that evidence emerges of the fraudulent trading that the order under sub-s 304(1) is sought against the defendants. Given that the proceedings before the High Court were not winding up proceedings or any proceedings against a company, the defendants contended that the claim must be dismissed.
 This argument was rejected at first instance. The High Court was of the view that sub-s 304(1) did not require the court to make a declaration against directors of a company in the same action against the company. The application may be made in separate proceedings after proceedings had been taken against the company and judgment had been obtained against the company in those proceedings, as was the case in the present facts.
way of an originating summons seeking a declaration had been initiated to make Siow, the managing director personally liable. Although this issue was not taken up in that case, the learned High Court judge was of the considered opinion that if the court was of the view that sub-s 304(1) was inapplicable, it would have ruled accordingly despite no arguments being raised on the point. In fact, the High Court permitted separate proceedings to be taken against the managing director.
 This was similarly the case in Cyber Village Sdn Bhd v Illustra IT (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors  MLJU 1853;  4 CLJ 613; LMW Electronics Pte Ltd v Ang Chuang Juay & Ors  1 MLJ 185; and Dato' Gan Ah Tee & Anor (in their capacity as liquidators of Par-Advance Sdn Bhd (in liquidation)) v Kuan Leo Choon & Ors  10 MLJ 706. In Tang Eng Iron Works Co Ltd v Ting Ling Kiew & Anor  2 MLJ 440, the court also agreed with the plaintiff's contention that an application under sub-s 304(1) may also be initiated prior to winding up of the company.
 We agree with the further submissions of learned counsel for the plaintiff that the action against the defendants are in any case, best taken in separate proceedings instead of in the same proceedings against the company. On a practical note, sub-s 304(1) ought not to be read literally as the court must first make a finding against the company before it can make the declaratory order and other consequential orders against the defendants. The Supreme Court in Ting Ling Kiew & Anor v Tang Eng Iron Works Co Ltd  2 MLJ 217;  1 CLJ (Rep) 331 was of the view that actions under sub-s 304(1) of the Companies Act 1965 should not be determined by way of affidavit evidence but by writ action. Every opportunity ought to be afforded to defendants to lead evidence to defend themselves. That is best served in trial proceedings after the plaintiff has established itself as a creditor of the company which is precisely the case here.
 Learned counsel for the plaintiff has also drawn our attention to several decisions from Singapore where the practice and the approach is the same; that the proceedings personally against persons such as directors are launched in separate proceedings from those taken against the company. See M+W Singapore Pte Ltd v Leow Tet Sin & Anor  SGHC 10;  2 SLR 271; Kon Yin Tong and another v Leow Boon Cher and others  SGHC 228; Amrae Benchuan Trading Pte Ltd (in Liq) v Tan Te Teck Gregory  4 SLR 969; Lim Teck Cheng v Wyno Marine Pte Ltd (in liquidation)  4 SLR 673; Liquidator of Leong Seng Hin Piling Pte Ltd v Chan Ah Lek & Ors  2 SLR 77.
 The position in the United Kingdom is quite different in several respects. Section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 deals with fraudulent trading.
(1) If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that any business of the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, the following has effect.
(2) The Court, on the application of the liquidator may declare that any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business above-mentioned are to be liable to make such contributions (if any) to the company's assets as the Court thinks proper.
 First of all, it is quite clear that the UK position envisages only one instance when such declaratory orders of personal liability for the company's debts may be made against someone other than the company, and that is in the course of liquidation proceedings.
 Further, the application may only be taken by the liquidator. In the Malaysian scenario, the application may be initiated by the liquidator or any creditor or contributory of the company.
 Finally, the orders that may be made are more restricted under s 213. Instead of the orders that one sees under our sub-s 304(1), the order that may be granted against such persons is to hold such persons liable to make such contributions (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper. This is what happened in the facts in Morphitis v Bernasconi  2 BCLC 1;  Ch 552 cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Aneka Melor.
 We have looked at the position in Australia and we agree with learned counsel for the defendant that s 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 is of little assistance. The terms of that provision are markedly different from our sub-s 304(1).
 Having examined our provision very carefully, and bearing in mind the third requirement that must be met before a right of action under sub-s 304(1) may be invoked, we therefore agree with the learned High Court judge in this regard, that the defendants do not need to be sued in the same suit taken against the company. Indeed, separate proceedings ought to be taken. Since the plaintiff is relying on the second limb of sub-s 304(1), the plaintiff necessarily has to sue the company first, secure judgment in its favour which renders it the status of 'creditor' before the plaintiff can initiate an action under sub-s 304(1).
 Therefore, an action against the defendants under sub-s 304(1) need not be maintained in the same set of proceedings brought against the company."