Thursday, 4 February 2016

MALAYSIA-POORLY DRAFTED MEMORANDUM OF APPEAL

In the Court of Appeal case of See Hua Realty Bhd (suing on behalf of itself and all other shareholders of the defendant except for the first and second defendant) v KTS News Sdn Bhd & Ors [2016] 1 MLJ 92, it was held that:-

"...[4] The appellant had filed a lengthy memorandum of appeal consisting of 20 pages which has no jurisprudential value in relation to a complaint related to derivative action which is a specific cause of action related to a pre determined relief. The appellant's approach in stating the complaint in the memorandum of appeal is bad in law for prolixity as well as irrelevancy and ought to have been ordered to be amended and/or struck out for breach of r 18(1) of the Rules of Court of Appeal 1994."

MALAYSIA-SHODDY INVESTIGATION

In the Court of Appeal case of Public Prosecutor v Yap Chai Yee  [2016] 1 MLJ 1, it was held that:-

"...(61) Before parting with the case, it is necessary to state that from the facts and circumstances of this appeal it would appear to us that the investigation had been somewhat shoddy. Undoubtedly, heinous crimes are committed under great secrecy and that investigation of a crime is a difficult and tedious task. At the same time the life and personal liberty of a citizen is a precious one guaranteed by art 5 of the Federal Constitution and its deprivation shall be only in accordance with law. (62) Thus, before accusing an innocent person of the commission of a grave crime like the one punishable under s 302 of the PC, an honest, sincere and dispassionate investigation has to be made and to feel sure that the person suspected of the crime alone was responsible to commit the offence. Therefore, greater care and circumspection are needed by the investigating agency in this regard.

[58] The shoddy investigation by SP5 had also incurred the wrath of the trial judge. The failure of SP5 to investigate promptly and thoroughly had clearly prejudiced the accused as held by the trial judge. His Lordship had made extensive reference to the evidence given by SP5 at pp 34-37 of the notes of proceedings. In the case of Chan King Yu v Public Prosecutor [2009] 1 MLJ 457, the Federal Court said as follows:

(84) As regards the material particulars relating to the existence of Man Chai which had been disclosed by the appellant in his cautioned statement exh D29 which was made on the day after his arrest, I am of the view that the police had all the time to check as to their veracity. The burden was on the prosecution to check whether the appellant's version of the facts as they appeared in the cautioned statement was true or false. The onus was upon the prosecution to disprove this important part of the appellant's version of facts. The appellant was under no duty to put to the investigation officer the aforesaid material particulars in view of their prior disclosure in the cautioned statement (see the case of Alcontara a/l Ambross Anthony v Public Prosecutor).

[59] To sum up, SP5 had failed to investigate on the following material matters:
2016 1 MLJ 1 at 19

  • (a)
    the materiality or role played by the property agent, KS Lim in this case; and 
  • (b)
    the materiality of Jimmy and Foong and most important of all whether they had free access to the said apartment. 
[60] The net result of the shoddy investigation was succinctly put by the Federal Court in Lee Kwan Woh v Public Prosecutor [2009] 5 MLJ 301 as follows:

The investigating officer's failure to investigate this allegation despite being informed of this fact during investigation was a serious omission. An inference in the accused's favour ought to have been drawn by the trial judge at the close of the prosecution case when the investigating officer's failure was brought to light. If so, doubt would have been cast upon the evidence of the investigating officer...."

MALAYSIA-DERIVATIVE ACTION

In the Court of Appeal case of See Hua Realty Bhd (suing on behalf of itself and all other shareholders of the defendant except for the first and second defendant) v KTS News Sdn Bhd & Ors  [2016] 1 MLJ 92, it was held that:-

"...[5] Derivative action at common law and now the new insertion under s 181A of the Companies Act 1965 is seen as an exception to the dominant rule that majority decision of a company is binding on the minority as advocated in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189.

[6] The well established principle in the case of Foss v Harbottle, advocates the proposition that: (i) courts will not interfere in matters of internal administration; (ii) it is for the majority members to decide the manner in which the affairs of the company are to be conducted.

[7] The plaintiff's action is based on the jurisprudence relating to derivative action. And derivative action is generally commenced by a minority shareholder who is a member to seek relief on behalf of the company against the majority or those who are in control of the company, who have done wrong to the company. Derivative action is an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (often referred to as proper plaintiff rule) where it was held that prima facie, every action must be brought in the name of the company to remedy a wrong done to it. Subsequent cases have made much inroads to this strict rule and now there is even a statutory provision by way of s 181A of the Companies Act 1965 which was inserted by an amending Act in 2007, which enables action to be brought in the name of the company itself for wrong done to the company. (Emphasis added.)

[8] The rule in Foss v Harbottle and the exception leading to derivative action has been explained in a number of cases. Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Melaka) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 3 MLJ 417; [1995] 4 CLJ 551 had this to say:

We begin with the rule in Foss v Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189. The rule has two limbs. The first limb of the rule - and the present appeal has nothing to do with its application - is that a Court will not interfere with the internal workings of a corporation upon a matter which is capable of being ratified by a majority of shareholders present and voting at a general meeting of the company. The content of the first limb, although it derives its name from the case just cited, in truth finds its origins in the earlier decision in Mozley v Alston [1847] 41 ER 833. The modern restatement of the rule is to be found in the judgment of Harman LJ in Bamford v Bamford [1970] Ch 212.
The second limb of the rule is of much wider purport and is universal in its application. It is based upon the doctrine that only he who has been injured may sue. Translated into company law, the proposition may be stated thus. If a wrong has been done to a company, then it is the company which is the proper plaintiff in an action brought to redress the injury. An individual shareholder or even a group of shareholders forming a minority on the floor of a general meeting of the company have no locus standi to bring an action to remedy a wrong done to a company. See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204.
Perhaps the clearest statement of the rule is to be found in the judgment of Jenkins LJ in Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 at p 1066:
The rule in Foss v Harbottle, as I understand it, comes to no more than this. First, the proper plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or association of persons is prima facie the company or the association of persons itself.
Secondly, where the alleged wrong is a transaction which might be made binding on the company or association and on all its members by a simple majority of the members, no individual member of the company is allowed to maintain an action in respect of that matter for the simple reason that, if a mere majority of the members of the company or association is in favour of what has been done, then cadit quaestio.
There are several exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle , both as a result of case law and through the intervention of Parliament. For present purposes, there are two exceptions that call for detailed discussion. We will refer to these later in this judgment.
The several exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle that are the product of case law appear in the illuminating judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr J (now FCJ) in Tan Guan Eng & Anor v Ng Kweng Hee & Ors [1991] 4 CLJ 74 (Rep);  [1991] 3 CLJ 1881. It is an important decision in the field of company law and in it there are set out several propositions that clarify the position in an area of the law that is not altogether free from difficulty. The exceptions referred to by His Lordship in that case are as follows:

  • (1)
    Ultra vires acts: 'in cases where the acts complained of are wholly ultra vires the company or association the rule has no application because there is no question of the transaction being confirmed by any majority'. 
  • (2)
    Fraud on the minority: 'where what has been done amounts to what is generally called in these cases as a fraud on the minority and the wrongdoers are themselves in control of the company, the rule is relaxed in favour of the aggrieved minority who are allowed to bring what is known as 'a minority shareholders' action on behalf of themselves and all others'. 
  • (3)
    Special majorities: 'an individual member (is not) prevented from suing if the matter ... (is) one which could validly be done or sanctioned, not by a simple majority of the members ... but only by some special majority'. 
  • (4)
    Personal rights: Where 'the personal and individual rights of members of (the plaintiffs) have been invaded', the rule 'has no application at all'. 
  • (5)
    When the justice of the case requires it, though this has been doubted by the English Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries (No 2).

For completeness, we refer to the statutory exception. This is to be found in the far reaching and extremely beneficial remedy housed in s 181 of the Companies Act 1965. It may, on reflection, be inaccurate to refer to it as an exception of the rule now under consideration. In truth it is an abrogation of the rule itself in those circumstances to which the section applies.
We now turn to consider the one exception with which this case is concerned. It is the derivative action; an ingenious procedural device created by Court of equity by which the rule of judicial non-interference is overcome. It is based upon the premise that the company which has been wronged is unable to sue because the wrongdoers are themselves in control of its decision making organs and will not, for that reason, permit an action to be brought in its name. In these circumstances, a minority shareholder may bring an action on behalf of himself and all the other shareholders of the company, other than the defendants. The wrongdoers must be cited as defendants. So too must the company. The title to the action must reflect that the suit is being brought in a representative capacity. The statement of claim or other pleading filed in support of the originating process must disclose that it is a derivative action and recite the facts that make it so. Further, there must be an express statement in the pleading that the action is being brought for the benefit of the company named as a defendant. An action that does not meet these requirements is liable to be struck out as being frivolous and vexatious.

[9] It must not be forgotten that the exception to Foss v Harbottle by way of derivative action was developed in the form of procedural device by the fiat of court to remedy a wrong that would otherwise escape redress. The learned authors of Guide to the Companies Act, A Ramaiya at p 112 had this to say:

The question whether this list of exceptions is exhaustive or whether the courts can go on expanding it whenever justice of the situation has been considered in a number of cases and has been thus answered by K NOX J in Smith v Croft (No 2), [1998] Ch 114 at pp 139 and 170 :  [1987] 3 All ER 909: 'The fact that such a yardstick (ie justice of the case) would or might be unsatisfactory because it does not give a practical guide to the limits of the rule and its exceptions does not detract from the fact that the 'whole doctrine whereby a minority shareholder is permitted to assert claims on behalf of the company is rooted in procedural expedients and adopted to prevent a wrongdoing without a redress'. The other cases in which this point has been considered are: Estamanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council, [1982] 1 WLR 2 at 11:  [1982] 1 All ER 437; Hawkesbury Development Co Ltd v Landmark Finance Pty Ltd [1969] 92 WN (NSW) at pp 199 and 208; Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd [1988] 14 ACLR 350, Western Australia.

[10] Exceptions to the proper plaintiff rule and its true exception is well articulated by the learned authors, Aiman Nariman, Aishah Bidin, Pamela Hanrahan, Ian Ramsay and Geof Stapledon, in their book titled Commercial Applications of Company Law in Malaysia, (3rd Ed) by CCH Publications at pp 360-361 as follows:

Exceptions to the proper plaintiff rule
Realising that breaches of duty may not be enforced where the alleged wrongdoers are directors who are a majority of the board, the courts subsequently developed several exceptions to the proper plaintiff rule in Foss v Harbottle. These are the exceptions to the proper plaintiff rule:

  •  
    [95] An infringement to a member's personal right; 
  •  
    [95] Ultra vires act: a conduct of the company which is against its objects clause - sec 20; 
  •  
    [95] A decision/ resolution requiring special majorities but passed by simple majorities; 
  •  
    [95] Fraud on the minority; 
  •  
    [95] Where justice of the case so requires. 
(See Tan Guan Eng v Ng Kweng Hee [1991] 4 CLJ 74 (Rep);  [1991] 3 CLJ 1881;  [1992] 1 MLJ 487; Abdul Rahim b Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Melaka) Sdn Bhd [1995] 4 CLJ 551;  [1995] 3 MLJ 417).
Nonetheless, the only true exception is fraud on the minority because this is a situation where the wrong is done against the company and the shareholder is allowed to enforce the company's rights on behalf of the company.

[11] There is much merit in the observation of the learned authors that 'the true exception is fraud on the minority' as in our view other infringements can be adequately dealt with, other than by way of derivative action...."

MALAYSIA-EFFECT OF FAILURE TO CROSS-EXAMINE ON MATERIAL PART OF CASE

In the Court of Appeal case of Enthiran a/l Rajoo v Public Prosecutor [2016] 1 MLJ 71, it was held that:-

"...Now, the law is trite that where there is a failure to cross-examine on certain aspect of the prosecution case, it can be equated to an admission - see Wong Swee Chin v Public Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 212. ..."

Malaysia-breach of the Agreement may give rise to damages for loss of profit pursuant to Section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950


 In the Federal Court case of SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor  [2015] MLJU 1160, it was held that:-

"... It is trite law that there is a need for there to be a valid reason to terminate, and that reason must have existed at the time of termination, even if the wrong reason was given at that time (see Chitty on Contract 31st Edition, E. Peel (eds) at 24-014). At common law, that usually means repudiatory breach, or breach of condition, or that there is a particular circumstance which gives rise to a contractual right to terminate. However, there appears to be no need for termination, where it happens by notice, to include particularised reasons as a matter of general common law, unless there are circumstances that give rise to a duty to do so, as in the case of a statutory duty or by the terms of a contract upon proper construction....

[26] The principles of interpretation of contract are as familiar as any canons of construction would be to legal practitioners.

[27] In recent times, the restatement of principles in the landmark case of Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896,912-913 "(ICS)" provides a helpful starting point for the consideration of the relevant principles. The judgment of Lord Hoffmann is as reproduced below, where His Lordship stated that:-

... I do not think that the fundamental change which has overtaken this branch of the law, particularly as a result of the speeches of Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381, 1384-1386 and Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989, is always sufficiently appreciated.

The result has been, subject to one important exception, to assimilate the way in which such documents are interpreted by judges to the common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life. Almost all the old intellectual baggage of 'legal' interpretation has been discarded. The principles may be summarised as follows:-

  • (1)
    Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. 
  • (2)
    The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the 'matrix of fact', but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man. 
  • (3)
    The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties and their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action for rectification . The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in ordinary life. The boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear. But this is not the occasion on which to explore them. 
  • (4)
    The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background may not merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax: see Mannai Investments Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1 508. 
  • (5)
    The 'rule' that words should be given their 'natural and ordinary meaning' reflects the common sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had. Lord Diplock made this point more vigorously when he said in Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB [1985] AC 191, 201:

    If detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to conclusion that flouts business common sense, it must be made to yield to business common sense.  .....

[40] Consistent with this analysis is the case of Berjaya Times Square (supra) where at [43] 621E, Gopal Sri Ram, FCJ (as His Lordship then was) adopting the British authorities, states :-

The most recent statement of the guideline to interpretation of contract statutes and other instruments is to be found in Attorney General of Belize & Ors v Belize Telecom [2009] UKPC 10, where delivering the advice of the board, Lord Hoffman said:-

The Court has no power to improve upon the instrument which it is called upon to construe, whether it be a contract, a statute or articles of association. It cannot introduce terms or make it fairer or more reasonable. If it is concerned only to discover what the instrument means. However, that meaning is not necessarily or always what the authors or parties to the document would have intended. It is the meaning which the instrument would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably be available to the audience to whom the instrument is addressed ..... It is this objective meaning which is conventionally called the intention of the parties or the intention of Parliament, or the intention of whatever person or body was or is deemed to have been the author of the instrument.


[41] Thus in addition to the above in interpreting the contract, the court must approach it holistically. No term is to be taken or interpreted in isolation. This canon of construction is so long established, it is almost banal. See for instance Chamber Colliery Ltd v Twyerould (1893) [1915] 1 Ch 268 (Note):-

... the application of the well-known (sic) rule that a deed ought to be read as a whole, in order to ascertain the true meaning of its several clauses; and that the words of each clause should be so interpreted as to bring them into harmony with the other provisions of the deed, if that interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally susceptible. ...

[104] As the aforementioned paragraphs illustrate, the answer to the question of law is perhaps not a simple 'yes' or 'no' but a more nuanced 'it depends on the proper construction of the contract'. Insofar as the Appellant contends that the Respondent, when terminating the contract, has a duty to give reasons in accordance with general law, that contention is false and without authority. Nonetheless, such a duty may be imposed by proper construction of the contract. Factors that lend towards establishing such a duty are, inter alia, where grounds for valid termination of the agreement are particularised in the contract and where the contract purports to give the party in breach an opportunity to remedy its unsatisfactory performance, such that without knowledge of the particular alleged breaches, no meaningful effort to remedy them can be taken. In the context of the present case, the notice of termination is bad in law. ...

[109] A common law right to terminate typically arises when there has been a breach of condition. A "neat" classification for whether or not a term is a condition is found in the judgment of Waller LJ in B S & N Ltd (BVI) v Micado Shipping Ltd (Malta) ('The Sea flower') [2001] CLC 421 at [42], citing Chitty on Contracts:

...a term of a contract will be held to be a condition:

  • (i)
    if it is expressly so provided by statute; 
  • (ii)
    if it has been so categorized as the result of previous judicial decision (although it has been said that some of the decisions on this matter are excessively technical and open to reexamination by the House of Lords); 
  • (iii)
    if it is so designated in the contract or if the consequences of its breach, that is, the right of the innocent party to treat himself as discharged, are provided for expressly in the contract; or 
  • (iv)
    if the nature of the contract or the subject-matter or the circumstances of the case lead to the conclusion that the parties must, by necessary implication, have intended that the innocent party would be discharged from further performance of his obligations in the event that the term was not fully and precisely complied with. 
Otherwise a term of a contract will be considered to be an intermediate term. Failure to perform such a term will ordinarily entitle the party not in default to treat himself as discharged only if the effect of breach of the term deprives him of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that he should obtain from the contract.

[110] The description in The Seaflower on the right to terminate for breach of an innominate term is derived from the judgments of Lord Diplock LJ in Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26 at [69-70, 72] and the judgment of Sellers LJ at [57] of the same case.
[111] Some further comments regarding some of the findings and analysis of breach in the present case will be made here. Firstly, and most obviously, the breach of Clause 6.9 is no longer relevant since Clause 6.9 was purported to apply 'after any event of termination of this Agreement, pursuant to Clause 8'. Since it is held that there was no valid Clause 8 termination, the obligations under Clause 6.9 accordingly fall away....

[115] Therefore, on a proper construction of the Agreement, we agree with the Appellant's submission that breach of the Agreement may give rise to damages for loss of profit pursuant to Section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950.

[116] Section 74(1) and (2) of the Contracts Act 1950is reproduced in this judgment:-

Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract 74. (1) When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by the breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be the likely result from the breach of it.
(2) Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.

[117] Thus we find that an assessment of damages would be appropriate in this appeal.

[117] Section 74(1) and (2) in Hamdan Johan v Felcra Bhd [2010] 3 CLJ 474 was held to substantially affirm the common law rule laid down in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341; 165 ER 145 where in the general assessment of damages for breach of contract, the general rule is that the aggrieved party is to be put in the same position as they would be if the contract had been properly performed, so that normally he is entitled to recover from the contract breaker his loss of profit or the benefit of the bargain. The other cases cited by the Appellant include Bank Bumiputera Malaysia Bhd Kuala Terengganu v Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 76 and Nikmat Masyhur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Johor Darul Ta'zim [2008] 9 CLJ 46 essentially set forth the same propositions i.e that the damage or loss suffered must be within the contemplation of both parties whether actual or constructive, that the loss suffered was a natural and probable result of the defendant's breach and that it included loss of profits. We have no disagreement with the statements of principle in this case. It is clear that a rate of commission amounting to 20% was agreed for the collection of the arrears, and it therefore would be the natural and probable result, as well as have been in the contemplation of the parties that premature termination would result in the loss of those profits...."


Malaysia- Section 101 to 103 , Evidence Act, 1950 govern the law on burden of proof

In Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Serdang Baru Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] MLJU 614, it was held that:-

"...[8] The legal burden of proving the case based on the pleaded claim lies throughout on the Plaintiff. Apart from that, the Plaintiff ('P') bears the evidential burden of introducing sufficient evidence to prove all the material and essential particulars of its claim as per the statement of claim. The Plaintiff ('P') has to make out a prima facie case on its pleadings before the onus shifts to the Defendants to establish their defence. In this context, the duty of the Plaintiff is to adduce all necessary and material evidence to prove the primary allegations of fact on which its cause of action is founded. P cannot just rely on factual assertions in its pleadings, which do not constitute proof of the facts in issue, notwithstanding the absence of rebuttal evidence on these unproven facts.

[9] Section 101 to 103 , Evidence Act, 1950govern the law on burden of proof:

Section 101 of in relation to on burden of proof provides that:-

  • (1)
    Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. 
  • (2)
    When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person. 
Section 102 of Evidence Act 1950on whom burden of proof lies provides that:-

The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

Section 103 of Evidence Act 1950 on burden of proof as to particular fact provides that:-

The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person."

Malaysia-It is an established principle of constitutional construction that no one provision of the Federal Constitution can be considered in isolation

In the Federal Court case of Zi Publications Sdn Bhd & Anor v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2015] MLJU 1159, it was held that:-

"...It is an established principle of constitutional construction that no one provision of the Federal Constitution can be considered in isolation. That particular provision must be brought into view with all the other provisions bearing upon that particular subject. This Court in Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v Kekatong Sdn Bhd & Anor [2004] 2 MLJ 257, applied the principle of considering the Constitution as a whole in determining the true meaning of a particular provision. This Court held:

A study of two or more provisions of a Constitution together in order to arrive at the true meaning of each of them is an established rule of constitutional construction. In this regard it is pertinent to refer to Bindra's Interpretaion of Statue 7th Ed which says at page 947-948:

The Constitution must be considered as a whole, and so as to give effect, as far as possible, to all its provisions. It is an established canon of constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, and considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purpose of the instrument...

It follows that it would be improper to interpret one provision of the Constitution in isolation from others ..."

Malaysia-whether a purchaser of real property who never became registered as a proprietor is entitled to invoke section 340 of the National Land Code 1965

In Dato' Capt Mohd Najib bin Abdullah v Natarjaya Sdn Bhd & Ors [2015] MLJU 1143, it was held that:-

"...One of the key legal issues arising in this case was whether a purchaser of real property who never became registered as a proprietor is entitled to invoke section 340 of the National Land Code 1965 (NLC), or whether only persons who were previously registered as proprietors may do so....

[12] In as far as the plaintiff's claim of fraud against the Natarjaya and its directors is concerned, they had not entered any appearance to defend themselves against such claim. Accordingly, based on the decision of the Federal Court in Kamarulzaman Omar v Yakub Husin & Ors, not only should a finding of fraud be taken as having been proven against the first to third defendants, but also this finding would be binding on the other defendants in the action....

[13] The following summarises the findings of this court:

  • (a)
    as mentioned above, the plaintiff's claim of fraud against the first to third defendants has been made out on account of their failure to enter a defence; 
  • (b)
    sufficient particulars of fraud have been pleaded, and therefore the plaintiff's claim does not fail on a mere point of pleading; 
  • (c)
    section 340 of the NLC is not merely available to invoked by a former registered proprietor, but may also be invoked by a beneficial owner, based on a reading of its plain words and on the authority of the Federal Court decision in Ong Chat Pang v Valliappa Chettiar (a case dealing with the predecessor provision to section 340 of the NLC in the FMS Land Code) and the more recent Court of Appeal decision in Samuel Naik Siang Ting & Ors v Public Bank Bhd ; ...

  • (e) 
  • based on the authority of the case of Ong Chat Pang, an immediate purchaser who was not implicated in any fraud can obtain an indefeasible title if he can show that he was a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration within the meaning of the proviso to section 340(3) of the NLC; ...

  • no issue arose as regards to the title of the fifth defendant as he was never registered as proprietor of the subject property. The plaintiff has not made out his case of fraud against the fifth defendant. As such, the plaintiff's claim against the fifth defendant is dismissed. ...
[26] The proposition that a beneficial owner who was not previously registered as proprietor may avail himself of section 340 to defeat the title of an existing registered proprietor is supported by the decision in Ong Chat Pang v Valliappa Chettiar .The facts in Ong Chat Pang bear similarity to those of the present case....

[39] The starting position in analysing land disputes and the application of section 340 of the NLCshould be the direction to trial judges given in Kamarulzaman Omar v Yakub Husin & Ors:

Before we adjourn, we would summarise the foregoing and pass on the following, as a guide to trial courts. Whenever a registered title or interest is sought to be set aside under s 340, first ascertain whether the title or interest under challenge is registered in the name of an immediate purchaser or a subsequent purchaser. If the title or interest is registered in the name of an immediate purchaser, the bona fides of the immediate purchaser will not offer a shield of indefeasibility. The title or interest of an immediate purchaser is still liable to be set aside if any of the vitiating elements as set out in s 340(2) has been made out. If the title or interest is registered in the name of a subsequent purchaser, then the vitiating elements in s 340(2) would not affect the title or interest of a bona fide subsequent purchaser. The title or interest of a subsequent purchaser is only liable to be set aside if the subsequent purchaser is not a bona fide subsequent purchaser. The title or interest acquired by a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a subsequent purchaser, is indefeasible.

[40] This passage seems to suggest that it is not necessary to consider whether the fourth defendant is complicit in the fraud on the basis that the title of an immediate purchaser is always defeasible by virtue of section 340(2); however, in my respectful view the dicta in that case goes further than was necessary to determine the issues in that case and should not apply where fraud is alleged but has not been proven against an immediate purchaser. Whether or not the title of the immediate purchaser is defeasible is dependent on the following:

  • (a) 
    if the immediate purchaser was a party or privy to a fraud, then his title is defeasible under section 340(2)(a); 
  • (b) 
    if the immediate purchaser was not complicit in the fraud, section 340(2)(a) does not operate to render the title defeasible in the hands of the immediate purchaser. Where the fraud was perpetrated by the vendor and prior registered proprietor, the title of the vendor becomes defeasible in the hands of the vendor, at the point in time the fraud was committed. Once the immediate purchaser becomes registered, then his title is defeasible under section 340(3)(a), on the basis that he is a transferee subsequent to the vendor, in relation to whose title the vitiating circumstance of fraud existed. It therefore follows that an immediate purchaser in this instance (ie one who was not implicated in the fraud) can obtain an indefeasible title if he can show that he was a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration. This was the position in the Federal Court decision of Ong Chat Pang; 
  • (c) 
    if the immediate purchaser obtained title through registration that was tainted by a forgery, or an insufficient or void instrument, then his title is defeasible under section 340(2)(b), regardless of his culpability. It is not even open to him to show that he was a purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration, in order to obtain indefeasible title. Of course, his title is nonetheless a good title, until challenged; and 
  • (d) 
    if the title of the immediate purchaser was unlawfully acquired in the purported exercise of any power of authority conferred by any written law, then the title of the immediate purchaser would be defeasible under section 340(2)(c). Again, it will not be open to the immediate purchaser to show that he was bona fide in the event of any challenge to his title. ...
[43] A note on the standard of proof for fraud in civil cases: the recent Federal Court decision in Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd now establishes that the standard of proof is on a balance of probabilities. ...

[49] The applicable test to determine good faith is summarised with characteristic perspicuousness in the judgment of Harmindar J in Overseas Realty Sdn Bhd v Wong Yau Choy & Ors; Tetuan Tay Ibrahim & Partners (Third Party) . I can do no better than to reproduce the relevant passages here:

[22] Now who is a good faith purchaser or sometimes known as a bona fide purchaser has been considered in a number of cases. In State Tailor Sdn Bhd v Nallapan [2005] 2 CLJ 167 the Court of Appeal held that the basic element of good faith is the absence of fraud, deceit or dishonesty and the knowledge or means of knowledge of such at the time of entry into a transaction but the overriding consideration is the particular circumstances of each case (per Richard Malanjum JCA (as he then was) at p. 184).

[23] In another Court of Appeal decision in Au Meng Nam & Anor v Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 4 CLJ 526, Raus Shariff JCA (as he then was) in a separate but supporting judgment held that a purchaser in good faith does not include a purchaser who is careless or who had been negligent. His Lordship took the view that a subsequent purchaser was "under an obligation to investigate properly all matters relating to the sale of the said land and not to just blindly accept what was claimed by the vendor as correct and genuine." When the purchaser "failed to take the ordinary precautions which ought to be taken in such a matter he is not entitled to the protection of the court. (at p. 554)

[24] It may therefore be surmised that in order to prove there was a bona fide purchase what is required of the purchaser is to establish that there was an honest dealing or honest conduct in the acquisition of any title or interest in any property (see also Ong Chat Pang & Anor v Valliappa Chettiar [1971] 1 LNS 96;; [1971] 1 MLJ 224). In this regard, there is a duty to make the necessary enquiries regarding the dealing as the particular circumstances of the case demands so as to acquire knowledge of any improper conduct. Any person who in the circumstances ought to have made the necessary inquiries but fails to do so may be guilty of wilful blindness or voluntary ignorance such that it would amount to unfair conduct. Even carelessness or negligence in doing so would disentitle the subsequent purchaser to the title or interest of any such property. It cannot be gainsaid that the duty to do so cannot be a light one as otherwise gross injustice would befall the innocent owner of the land.

[50] For a purchaser to discharge the burden of showing that he is a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, the purchaser must not only show the absence of fraud, deceit or dishonesty but also that he had taken the ordinary precautions that a reasonably prudent purchaser would have taken in the circumstances. A reasonably prudent purchaser in this context means a person with the knowledge, attributes and circumstances of the particular purchaser in question....

[56] The fifth defendant was never registered as proprietor of the subject property, and therefore no issue arises as to his title. At trial, there was no evidence adduced to establish any fraud on the part of the fifth defendant. As such, the plaintiff's claim against the fifth defendant is dismissed...."

Malaysia-Advocacy Training Course, Kuala Lumpur | March 2016 (5 and 6 Mar 2016)

Advocacy Training Course, Kuala Lumpur | March 2016 (5 and 6 Mar 2016)





If this email does not display correctly, please click here to view the content online.




This circular and the attachment may also be accessed here.


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Malaysia-Press Release | The Attorney General Must Reconsider MACC's Investigation Papers on the Transfer of Funds into the Personal Bank Accounts of the Prime Minister

Press Release | The Attorney General Must Reconsider MACC's Investigation Papers on the Transfer of Funds into the Personal Bank Accounts of the Prime Minister






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Press Release
The Attorney General Must Reconsider MACC's Investigation Papers on the Transfer of Funds into the Personal Bank Accounts of the Prime Minister
The Malaysian Bar is gravely concerned over the Attorney General's decision of 26 January 2016 on the three investigation papers submitted to him by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission ("MACC") concerning the transfer of USD681 million ("the purported donation") and the transfer of funds from SRC International Sdn Bhd ("SRC"), both into the personal bank accounts of the Prime Minister.  The Attorney General has declared that he is satisfied that no criminal offence has been committed by the Prime Minister, and instructed MACC to close the three investigation papers.
It was subsequently reported that MACC decided to refer the decision of the Attorney General to two of its statutory oversight panels: the Operations Review Panel and the Special Panel.[1]  Both these panels reviewed the decision, and on 28 January 2016 advised MACC to engage with the Attorney General regarding his decision.[2] 
The advice of MACC's oversight panels is not surprising.  The decision of the Attorney General to exonerate the Prime Minister of any criminal offence appears to be unsustainable in law.  The decision seems premature, lacking in facts, bereft of particulars, and founded on questionable or inadequate reasons.
In respect of the purported donation, it has been reported that MACC's probe is ongoing.  The Attorney General has been asked by MACC to request documents and statements from individuals from several overseas financial institutions[3] under the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002.[4]  This is necessary to ascertain the veracity of the evidence that MACC has already collated in Malaysia.  Without this elementary scrutiny of the obtained evidence, the investigation would be incomplete.
However, the Attorney General has refused to make the request, on the basis that he has discovered no criminal offence in relation to the purported donation.[5]  This explanation prompts many basic questions that persist and need to be answered, such as:  Who specifically made the donation of USD681 million to the Prime Minister between 22 March 2013 and 10 April 2013?  What was the purpose of this donation?  If the purpose has not been identified, is it proper to conclude that no criminal offence has been committed?
The Attorney General has also said that USD620 million of the purported donation was returned by the Prime Minister to the alleged donor in August 2013.  This disclosure, made more than six months after the revelation of the transfer of funds into the Prime Minister's personal bank accounts, raises more troubling questions:  Was Bank Negara Malaysia and/or MACC notified of the repatriation of the USD620 million?  What happened to the balance of USD61 million that was not returned to the donor?  If the manner in which the USD61 million was utilised by the Prime Minister has not been ascertained, how would the presumption of corrupt practice in Section 50 of the MACC Act 2009 be rebutted?
In relation to the transfer of funds from SRC, the Attorney General has omitted to specify the exact sum of money that was transferred into the Prime Minister's personal bank accounts.  It was previously reported that RM42 million from SRC had been deposited into the Prime Minister's personal bank accounts.[6]  It has now been reported that an additional RM27 million from SRC was deposited into the personal bank accounts of the Prime Minister on 8 July 2014.[7]  This would appear to bring the total deposit from SRC to RM69 million.  The Attorney General has regrettably not addressed this apparent and glaring discrepancy.
The Attorney General has also not disclosed who gave the approval for the transfer of monies into the Prime Minister's personal bank accounts, the purpose of the transfer, and how the account numbers of the Prime Minister's personal bank accounts were obtained.
The Attorney General has stated that there was no evidence that the Prime Minister had any knowledge, or had been informed, of the transfer of monies from SRC into his personal bank accounts.  However, an account holder is deemed to know, and cannot claim to be unaware, of transactions concerning his personal bank accounts.  Knowledge can be implied or inferred in certain circumstances.  In this regard, it has been reported that RM3.2 million was paid from one of these bank accounts to two credit card accounts.[8]
The Attorney General further stated that the evidence shows that the Prime Minister believed that "all payments which were made by him were made from the donation received from the Saudi royal family which was earlier transferred to his personal accounts".[9]  This finding appears implausible, as RM27 million from SRC was reportedly transferred into the Prime Minister's personal bank accounts on 8 July 2014,[10] which was after the balance of USD620 million of the purported donation had been returned in August 2013.
In the circumstances, the Attorney General's decision that no criminal offences have been committed in respect of MACC's investigation papers is hasty and difficult to justify.  Indeed, there have been reports that the Attorney General rejected MACC's recommendations[11] in the investigation papers, that three charges pursuant to Section 403 of the Penal Code (dishonest misappropriation of property) be levelled against the Prime Minister.[12]
Further, the Attorney General's directive to MACC to close its investigation papers, particularly where the investigation is incomplete, is beyond the Attorney General's authority.  It could be perceived as an act of interference in the investigation.  The Attorney General should render all assistance to MACC to facilitate ongoing investigations, or fresh investigations, as and when additional or new evidence is discovered.
The Malaysian Bar also disagrees with statements, attributed to certain quarters, that the discretion of the Attorney General under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution to decline to exercise his prosecutorial powers is "absolute" and cannot be questioned in court.  The notion of absolute discretionary powers is contrary to the rule of law.  All legal powers — even a constitutional power — have legal limits.[13]  Thus, the modern and prevailing view is that the Attorney General's decision not to prosecute is open to challenge in a judicial review action, if the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion is tainted by bad faith, dishonesty or extraneous purposes.[14]  The Attorney General's prosecutorial powers are therefore not unfettered.
The Malaysian Bar therefore urges the Attorney General to reconsider his decision on the transfer of funds into the personal bank accounts of the Prime Minister, and to exercise the prosecutorial powers in Article 145(3) Federal Constitution appropriately.
Steven Thiru
President
Malaysian Bar
2 February 2016
_______________________________________________________

[1] See Part III of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009.
[2] Press statement by Operation Review Panel and Special Panel of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission entitled "MACC To Engage AG For Recent Decision", 28 January 2016.
[3] "Apandi can't close investigations, should help MACC, says former A-G", The Malaysian Insider, 28 January 2016.
[4] See Part II, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2002.
[8] "Dark cloud over entire probe: Pua", The Sun, 29 January 2015.
[9] "Statement from A-G on Najib, RM2.6 billion and SRC International", The Malaysian Insider, 28 January 2016.
[10] "Did Tabung Haji bail out firms linked to SRC money trail, asks DAP", The Malaysian Insider, 2 February 2016.
[11] "Report: AG ignored MACC advice to charge Najib", Malaysiakini, 28 January 2016.
[12] "Sources: MACC proposed three charges under Penal Code", Malaysiakini, 27 January 2016.
[13] Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home Affairs [1998] SLR 132 at 156.
[14] Rosli bin Dahlan v Tan Sri Abdul Gani bin Patail & Ors [2014] MLJU 559; Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guan Huat Neo Phylis [2008] 2 SLR 239; R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene  [1999] 3 WLR 972.


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GST Self-Assessment, Control Framework, Governance and Risk Management ( 24 & 25 February 2016 )

GST Self-Assessment, Control Framework, Governance and Risk Management ( 24 & 25 February 2016 )
To:



GST Self-Assessment, Control Framework, Governance and Risk Management
                                                                                     
Date    :    24 & 25 February 2016
Time    :    9.00 am - 5.00 pm
Venue  :    Concorde Hotel, Kuala Lumpur

*Register NOW and get a complimentary copy of "GST Compliance Made Easy, Malaysia" worth RM125


WHO SHOULD ATTEND

Ø  Accounts Executive
Ø  Accountant
Ø  Finance Manager
Ø  IT Manager
Ø  Head of Department
Ø  Finance Director / Financial Controller / CFO
Ø  General Manager
Ø  CEO / COO
Ø  Director
Ø  Business Owner

As the Malaysian Government shifts more of its attention to the Goods and Services Tax (GST), businesses must put in place good GST practices within their internal processes to properly handle the GST reporting of transactions. The Royal Malaysian Customs Department (RMCD) are still providing updates and issuing penal decisions to address the various contentious implementation issues arising. In view of the complexities of GST, appropriate measures, assessment and control framework should be adopted to mitigate the risks of GST non-compliance and common errors.

CCH Executive Events present a two-day workshop to provide ideas and guidance to improve GST compliance, mitigate risks and to set up a robust GST Control Framework on a sustainable long term basis. This workshop will be interactive using power-point presentation with case studies from Australia and Singapore with practical examples and illustrations applicable to Malaysian GST model. Learn to carry out self-assessment with pre-submission checkpoints to ensure that GST returns are correct before submission.


BENEFITS OF ATTENDING

ü  To perform self-assessment of GST tax submission and to discover GST errors
ü  Setting up GST Control Framework for good corporate governance
ü  To perform holistic GST risk based review to ensure effective GST controls
ü  To ensure the completeness and accuracy of GST reporting
ü  To improve compliance by understanding the common GST errors


PROGRAMME OUTLINE

Revisit of the Malaysian GST Model and Current Issues
·         Scope of Malaysian GST model and what is out-of-scope
·         Revisit the key concepts of GST and readiness assessment
o    Supply and output tax
o    Acquisitions / purchases and input tax
·         Contentious GST issues
·         Common errors

GST Audit and Risk Mitigation
·         Why GST audit is being carried out?
·         Types of GST audit and real case study on audit carried out by RMCD
·         What are the consequences for obstructing the audit?
·         Understanding GST offences and penalties
·         What happens at the conclusion of an audit?
·         Measures to improve GST compliance and risk mitigation

GST Self-Assessment
·         GST compliance and errors - is your company at risk?
·         Why do you need to self-assess your GST03 tax submission and to discover GST errors?
·         Lessons to be from Singapore

GST Self-Assessment Compliance Guide
Section 1 – Putting in place GST Practices and System to properly handle the reporting of transactions.
What are the key areas, essential requirements and good practices?

Section 2 – Self-assessment using the Pre-Filing Checklist
What are the processes and steps to ensure that GST03 tax returns are correct before submission?

Section 3 – Performing Annual Review
How to perform review of past GST03 tax returns for early detection of errors and to avoid costly penalties?

GST Control Framework and Risk Management
·         Why do you need to have GST Control Framework in place?
·         Risk management through a holistic risk-based review for effective GST controls
·         Establishing GST Control Framework – the Singapore and Australia experience
·         GST Control Framework Guide to manage GST risks and secure on-going GST compliance
-Entity, Transaction and Reporting Levels
·         Adopting GST Control Framework for the stakeholders on a sustainable long term basis

*Participants are expected to have attended GST training and familiar with basic GST concepts and mechanism to ensure effectiveness of this workshop.


WORKSHOP SPEAKER

Yee Hun Leek
BSc(Econ)Hons(London), MSc(UoG), PhD Candidate(Curtin)
CA(M), FCCA(U.K), CTP, CP(Consulting)AIMUK, PHF

Yee was trained and qualified as a chartered accountant with a Big Four international accounting firm in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. He is the founder and managing partner of a chartered accountants firm, Messrs. YHL & Associates, providing audit and assurance services. He is also the founder and executive director of YHL Consulting Group Sdn. Bhd., a tax and business consultancy company. Yee has extensive experience in various industries and provides consultancy services to a wide range of businesses. He was the principal consultant and acting CFO for a Malaysian group of companies that have successfully listed via reverse takeover on the AIM Market of London Stock Exchange, UK, in January 2008. He has also appeared as an expert witness at the High Court of Malaysia for his opinion on accounting and finance matters in civil cases. With his wealth of experience, Yee has conducted public and in-house training for listed companies, multinational companies, universities, HRDF approved training providers, associations, accounting and tax firms, non-profitable organisations and more.

Yee has attended a 10-day GST tax agent course conducted jointly by the Chartered Tax Institute of Malaysia and the Royal Malaysian Customs Department. He passed the examination required to register as a GST tax agent. He has conducted GST training for specialised industries at an advanced level for listed companies, multinational companies, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Malaysia. In addition, his multidisciplinary team in the GST Practice Unit has provided advisory, review and implementation services to assist companies in achieving a smooth transition and implementation of GST and to ensure compliance of the GST Act 2014.


WORKSHOP FEE

Fee includes workshop materials, certificate of attendance, lunch and refreshments.

CCH Subscriber        :           RM2,035.20

Non-Subscriber       :           RM2,289.60

* Prices are inclusive of 6% GST


For full information, please refer to the brochure attached or click on this link :-


The above workshop is HRDF claimable under the Skim Bantuan Latihan and to sign up, please complete the registration form and scan to e-mail back to me
or fax to 03-2026 2093.

Do contact me anytime for further clarification and assistance. 


Thanks & regards,

Sarah Abdullah
Senior Events Consultant 

Commerce Clearing House (M) Sdn Bhd
Level 26, Menara Weld
No. 76, Jalan Raja Chulan, 50200 Kuala Lumpur
D   :  +603 2024 8608
F    :  +603 2026 2093
E    :  sarah@cch.com.my


Please click HERE for our upcoming CCH Executive Events.




Malaysia-Invitation to Participate in Mentor-Mentee Programme Relating to Practice Management

Invitation to Participate in Mentor-Mentee Programme Relating to Practice Management





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Circular No 029/2016
Dated 3 Feb 2016
To Members of the Malaysian Bar
Invitation to Participate in Mentor-Mentee Programme Relating to Practice Management
The Bar Council Small Firms Committee("SFC") is pleased to announce that the Register of Mentors, which is available on the Malaysian Bar Website, has been updated.
The Register of Mentors contains names of senior Members of the Bar, who have agreed to share their wealth of knowledge and experience from years of running a legal practice.
The Register of Mentors, which is updated periodically, is attached.  It is also accessible here, or from the drop-down menu under the "Directories" tab on the Malaysian Bar website.
The objective of maintaining such a list is to provide Members, who are new in practice and wish to set up their own practice, or who are sole proprietors or partners of smaller firms, an opportunity to seek guidance from senior Members on issues relating to practice management.
(1) To schedule an appointment to meet with mentors, please contact them directly using their contact details as provided in the Register, which is attached with this circular.
We hope that Members of the Bar who require help and guidance in areas of practice management will avail themselves of this opportunity.  
(2)   SFC invites Members of the Bar to take on the role of being a mentor, which will enable the register to be updated.  If you are interested to serve as a mentor in support of this initiative, please complete and submit the attached reply slip by email to vanimalar@malaysianbar.org.my; or bazli@malaysianbar.org.my.
Bar Council thanks all mentors for kindly consenting to assist and guide fellow members of the profession.
Should you have any enquiries, please contact Vanimalar Money Selvam, Officer, by telephone at 03-2050 2100, or by email at vanimalar@malaysianbar.org.my.
Thank you.
George Varughese
Chairperson
Small Firms Committee
If you are a registered user of the Malaysian Bar website, you may click here to access this circular and the attachments. 






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Malaysia-Reminder | Guidelines for Interbank E-Payment in Respect of Redemption or Disbursement of Financing Facilities

Reminder | Guidelines for Interbank E-Payment in Respect of Redemption or Disbursement of Financing Facilities






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Circular No 028/2016
Dated 3 Feb 2016
To Members of the Malaysian Bar
Reminder | Guidelines for Interbank E-Payment in Respect of Redemption or Disbursement of Financing Facilities
We refer to Circular No 154/2014 dated 17 July 2014, entitled "Guidelines for Interbank E-Payment in Respect of Redemption or Disbursement of Financing Facilities", in which we highlighted that Bank Negara Malaysia had directed all financial institutions to cease issuing cheques for interbank payments.
In 2014, the Bar Council and The Association of Banks in Malaysia worked together and agreed on a set of guidelines to immediately address the process flow for redemption or disbursement of financing facilities.  The guidelines, which were contained in Circular No 154/2014, took effect on 14 July 2014.
The Association of Banks in Malaysia recently brought to our attention that some Members of the Bar are allegedly not aware of these guidelines.
Members are requested to take note of the guidelines, a copy of which is attached for your reference.
Should you have any enquiries, please contact Chuah Ying Ying, Executive Officer, by telephone at 03-2050 2106 or by email at yingying@malaysianbar.org.my.
Thank you.
Low Beng Choo
Chairperson
Conveyancing Practice Committee
This circular and the attachment may also be accessed here.





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Proview eBook Bi-Weekly Offer - Get your copy at 20% off!

Proview eBook Bi-Weekly Offer - Get your copy at 20% off! ...