Friday, 7 December 2012

MALAYSIA-whether a plaintiff, being a secured creditor, is required to obtain leave from the winding-up court as provided in Section 226(3) (a) of the Companies Act, 1965 before filing an originating process in court to enforce its statutory remedy under a charge against a property


In Ambank (M) Berhad v CA Steel Sdn Bhd [2012] MLJU 421, it was held that:-

"...[12] The sole issue for the consideration of this court is, whether the plaintiff, being a secured creditor, is required to obtain leave from the Winding Up Court as provided in S 226(3) (a) of the  Companies Act before this Originating Summons is filed in court to enforce the statutory remedy under the Charge against the property.
[13] This court is of the considered view that:-

(i)          no leave is required to be obtained from the Winding Up Court by the plaintiff, a secured creditor, to enforce the statutory remedy.
(ii)         The plaintiff did not commence any action, neither has the plaintiff sued the defendant for the recovery of the banking facilities or loan granted to the defendant company.
(iii)        The plaintiff has filed this Originating Summons to enforce the statutory remedy under the Charge against the property by seeking an order of the court for the sale of the secured property...."

It was further held that:-

"...[14] A secured creditor is entitled to stand aloof from the liquidation, (see Re Your Size Fashions Ltd (1990) NZLR 727 at p 733). The secured creditor's status that he stands outside the liquidation and that he must be paid first in preference over other unsecured creditors remains intact, (see Director of Customs, Federal Territory v Ler Cheng Chye (Liquidator of Castwell Sdn Bhd, in Liquidation) (1995) 2 MLJ 600 and followed in K. Balasubramanian, Liquidator for Kosmopolitan Credit & Leasing Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) v MBF Finance Bhd & Anor (2005) 2 MLJ 201 at p 224). By implication and analogy of the two cases, s 226(3) (a) of the  Companies Act must necessarily apply only to unsecured creditors so as to place them upon an equality and to pay their debts pari passu, (see Re Oak Pitts Colliery Company (1882) 21 Ch. D 322 which is referred to in Sri Jeluda Sdn Bhd v Pentalink Sdn Bhd (2008) 3 MLJ 692 at p 702).
[15] Therefore, it is the considered view of this court that the proceeding which is filed in the present case is brought against the security rather than against the defendant company and shall not affect the rights and powers of the secured creditor to enforce the statutory remedy under the statutory Charge. Accordingly, the proceeding in the present case is not barred or caught by s 226(3) (a) of the  Companies Act as the provision does not apply to a secured creditor, like the plaintiff in the present case. A statutory Charge under the National Land Code takes effect as a security only, and enforceable by proceedings in court to obtain a judicial sale, (see Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd (Appointed Receiver and Manager) (In Liquidation) v Bank Bumiputera (M) Bhd & Ors (1997) 2 MLJ 805 at p. 827). In fact, the Supreme Court had referred to the case of Sowman v David Samuel Trusts Ltd (1978) 1 ALL ER 616 where there was a sale of property which did not belong to the company but formed part of the debenture holder's security and therefore held it did not contravene S 227 of the Companies Act 1948 (pari materia to our   S 223 of the  Companies Act 1965). (see also CGU Insurance Bhd v Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd and Other Appeals (2002) 2 MLJ 1, Zaitun Marketing Sdn Bhd v Boustead Eldred Sdn Bhd (2010) 3 CLJ 85, Abric Project Management (2007) 7 CLJ 515 at p. 532, United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd v Andrew Lee Siew Ling (Civil Appeal No. J-02(IM)-2786-2009) (Unreported) [Coram: Jefferey Tan Kok Hua (JCA) (now FCJ), Zaharah binti Ibrahim (JCA), Linton Albert (JCA)]. However, the only legal limitation that is imposed upon the plaintiff is that the secured creditor must realise the security within six months of the Winding Up order. Otherwise the rights to impose interest is curtailed in that, the secured creditor cannot enforce the rights for the interest beyond that period. In fact, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has been candid and had informed this court that the plaintiff did not claim for any interest after the order of Winding Up against the defendant.
In Re Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd (1997) 3 MLJ 435, the case referred and relied on by the Official Receiver's Office can be distinguished on the facts and the surrounding circumstances.

(i)          In that case, there was a validation order granted by a High Court pursuant to   s 292 of the  Companies Act 1965 in respect of a private sale and purchase agreement entered into between Campall, acting through its Directors and a third party which was made conditional upon the validation by the court of the said sale.
(ii)         The validation order was granted on 7.12.1993 by the court. In consequence to the validation order and the realisation of the assets of Campall, there was a dispute when it came to the distribution of the assets to all its creditors and the order of priority as provided under   s 292 of the  Companies Act.
(iii)        As a result, the Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd, applied to the court for various orders on the distributions of the assets against the liquidator. The liquidator objected to the application and had raised preliminary objection that the application was premature and that Perdana Bank's entitlement was only to the proceeds of the sale of the secured property after deducting the proper expenses and disbursement incurred. The liquidator contended that the deposit paid pursuant to the private agreement which was forfeited and interest earned were not part of the proceed of the sale of the properly and that the Perdana Bank's claim would rank pari pasu with the other creditors and that the liquidator was entitled to his remuneration as fixed by the Committee of Inspection.
(iv)        In those circumstances, and the background facts, His Lordship Abdul Malik Ishak J (now JCA) in allowing the liquidators preliminary objection and dismissing Perdana Bank's application had held that the leave was required under   S 226 (3) (a) of the  Companies Act and that the application was premature.

[16] However, as stated above, the present Originating Summons which was filed by the plaintiff-chargee is to seek an order of court to enforce the statutory right and remedy against the charge. Therefore, it is the respectful view of this court that the reasons given, the facts and the surrounding circumstances in Re Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd can be easily distinguished as summarised above and poles apart when compared to this straight forward application by the plaintiff in the present case, (see Zaitun Marketing Sdn Bhd v Boustead Eldred Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd) [2010] 2 MLJ 749; [2010] 3 CLJ 785 for duties of a Liquidator).
[17] Be that as it may, in any event even if leave was required which this court wishes to reiterate there is no such requirement for a secured creditor, like the plaintiff, who was only enforcing its statutory right and remedy against the property, there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining leave from the Winding Up Court after having filed this Originating Summons in court. Leave may be obtained even if proceedings had been filed or commenced and not to treat proceedings as ipso facto to nullities as proceedings began without leave are curable by later grant of leave, (see Re Saunders (a Bankrupt) Re Bearman (a Bankrupt) (1997) 3 ALL ER 992), Re Wanzer Limited (1891) 1 ChD 305 at p. 312)
"It directs what ought to be done But it does not oblige the court to close the gates of mercy upon the applicant but enables it to stay proceedings until that consent, which as a matter of duty ought to be obtained in the first instance is obtained at last" (Rendal v Blair (1890) 45 Ch D 139 at p. 158) (see also In Trusst and Guarantee Co. Ltd v Brenner (1933) SCR 656 at p. 663, Nazir Ahmad v Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd (In Liquidation) (1942) (29) AIR (Lah) 189)

[18] S 226(3) (a) of the  Companies Act does not affect the power of any secured creditor to realise or otherwise deal with the security and the rights are protected and that there is no requirement to seek the leave of the Winding Up Court for realising the security. In other words, the secured creditor stands outside the Winding Up proceedings unless he himself chooses to submit to the jurisdiction of the Winding Up Court (see also Padmavathamma and ors v Battepati Pasthasarathi (1996) 4 Andh LT 272). A secured creditor cannot be deprived of his security until he has been paid in full, (see Re Joint Stock Discount Company, Warrant Finance Company's case No.2 (1870) 10 Equity 11, Re David Llyod and Company (1877) 6 Ch D. 339 at p. 343 as referred to in Ram Chand v Bank for Celyer India, Limited Delhi and another (1922) Lahore 281, Nrishinha Kumar Siha v Deb Prosanna Mukherjee and Ors AIR (1935) Col 460, Koshi Bai and Another v Chunilal Hathising and Orther AZR (1930) Bombay 11).
[19] As stated above, this court wishes to reiterate and is of the considered view that the S 226(3)(a) of the  Companies Act was not intended for the enforcement of a statutory right and remedy against the property charged to the plaintiff Bank as the proceeding is not against the liquidator. If s 226(3)(a) of the  Companies Act was intended to cover and is insisted upon to be applied against a secured creditor, like the plaintiff Bank, to enforce the statutory remedy on the security property, no Bank or Financial Institution may be willing to grant banking or credit facilities to their potential customers if they would also be expected to rank pari passu and be in the queue with the other creditors. Consequently, and if the plaintiff Bank had to be in the queue, and is to be repaid in accordance and rank pari passu, which in some cases may not be sufficient to satisfy the entire claim outstanding, obviously, it is not good for the country's economy and the Financial Institution. It may also adversely affect other potential customers who may be in need of financial assistance but may not able to obtain the facility until the bank had recovered the whole outstanding sum. The bank may also be reluctant to grant banking facilities even with the security as the same will frustrate the Financial Institution who may not be able to recover the entire loan or facilities granted to the customers and the possibility of the collapse of the Banking Sector cannot be ruled out and the safeguard given to a secured lender may be defeated or frustrated. It is the respected view of this court that S 226(3)(a) of the  Companies Act does not bind a secured creditor and there is no bar for a secured creditor, such as the plaintiff in the present case to enforce the statutory remedy without leave from the Winding Up Court as the plaintiff did not institute any action or suit, (see also Lim Eng Chuan Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Corp & Anor (2011) 1 MLJ 486).
[20] As stated above, the only limitation that is imposed upon a secured creditor is that he must realise the security within 6 months from the date of the Winding Up order. Otherwise, the secured creditors' right to impose further interest cannot be included to the outstanding amount owing beyond the date of the Winding up order, (see s 291(1) of the  Companies Act 1965 read with s 4(1) of the  Civil Law Act 1956, S.8 (2A) and paragraph 9 of Schedule C and   s 42 of the  Bankruptcy Act 1967 (see also K. Balasubramaniam (Likuidator bagi Kosmopolitan Credit & Leasing Sdn Bhd) v MBF Finance Bhd & Ors (2005) 2 MLJ 201, followed in United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd v Andrew Lee Siew Ling (Civil Appeal No. J-02(IM)-2786-2009) (Unreported) [Coram: Jefferey Tan Kok Hua (JCA) (now FCJ), Zaharah binti Ibrahim (JCA), Linton Albert (JCA)]. At the same time, the secured creditor cannot disregard in totality the order of the Winding Up Court or the insolvency proceedings or to treat the Winding Up Order as non-existence. The statutory rights or remedy only saves the power of the secured creditor to realise his security or otherwise deal as with it to recover the outstanding sum or the banking facilities on the security, (see Padmavathamma and Ors v Batteryati Parthasarathi (1996) 4 Andh.L.T. 272).
[21] In the circumstances and for the reasons stated above, this court is of the considered view that the S 226(3)(a) of the  Companies Act has no application whatsoever to a secured creditor who has the statutory right to commence foreclosure proceeding where in the present case, the plaintiff is merely enforcing its statutory remedy..."

MALAYSIA-whether a plaintiff, being a secured creditor, is required to obtain leave from the winding-up court as provided in Section 226(3) (a) of the Companies Act, 1965 before filing an originating process in court to enforce its statutory remedy under a charge against a property


In Ambank (M) Berhad v CA Steel Sdn Bhd [2012] MLJU 421, it was held that:-

"...[12] The sole issue for the consideration of this court is, whether the plaintiff, being a secured creditor, is required to obtain leave from the Winding Up Court as provided in S 226(3) (a) of the  Companies Act before this Originating Summons is filed in court to enforce the statutory remedy under the Charge against the property.
[13] This court is of the considered view that:-

(i)          no leave is required to be obtained from the Winding Up Court by the plaintiff, a secured creditor, to enforce the statutory remedy.
(ii)         The plaintiff did not commence any action, neither has the plaintiff sued the defendant for the recovery of the banking facilities or loan granted to the defendant company.
(iii)        The plaintiff has filed this Originating Summons to enforce the statutory remedy under the Charge against the property by seeking an order of the court for the sale of the secured property...."

It was further held that:-

"...[14] A secured creditor is entitled to stand aloof from the liquidation, (see Re Your Size Fashions Ltd (1990) NZLR 727 at p 733). The secured creditor's status that he stands outside the liquidation and that he must be paid first in preference over other unsecured creditors remains intact, (see Director of Customs, Federal Territory v Ler Cheng Chye (Liquidator of Castwell Sdn Bhd, in Liquidation) (1995) 2 MLJ 600 and followed in K. Balasubramanian, Liquidator for Kosmopolitan Credit & Leasing Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) v MBF Finance Bhd & Anor (2005) 2 MLJ 201 at p 224). By implication and analogy of the two cases, s 226(3) (a) of the  Companies Act must necessarily apply only to unsecured creditors so as to place them upon an equality and to pay their debts pari passu, (see Re Oak Pitts Colliery Company (1882) 21 Ch. D 322 which is referred to in Sri Jeluda Sdn Bhd v Pentalink Sdn Bhd (2008) 3 MLJ 692 at p 702).
[15] Therefore, it is the considered view of this court that the proceeding which is filed in the present case is brought against the security rather than against the defendant company and shall not affect the rights and powers of the secured creditor to enforce the statutory remedy under the statutory Charge. Accordingly, the proceeding in the present case is not barred or caught by s 226(3) (a) of the  Companies Act as the provision does not apply to a secured creditor, like the plaintiff in the present case. A statutory Charge under the National Land Code takes effect as a security only, and enforceable by proceedings in court to obtain a judicial sale, (see Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd (Appointed Receiver and Manager) (In Liquidation) v Bank Bumiputera (M) Bhd & Ors (1997) 2 MLJ 805 at p. 827). In fact, the Supreme Court had referred to the case of Sowman v David Samuel Trusts Ltd (1978) 1 ALL ER 616 where there was a sale of property which did not belong to the company but formed part of the debenture holder's security and therefore held it did not contravene S 227 of the Companies Act 1948 (pari materia to our   S 223 of the  Companies Act 1965). (see also CGU Insurance Bhd v Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd and Other Appeals (2002) 2 MLJ 1, Zaitun Marketing Sdn Bhd v Boustead Eldred Sdn Bhd (2010) 3 CLJ 85, Abric Project Management (2007) 7 CLJ 515 at p. 532, United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd v Andrew Lee Siew Ling (Civil Appeal No. J-02(IM)-2786-2009) (Unreported) [Coram: Jefferey Tan Kok Hua (JCA) (now FCJ), Zaharah binti Ibrahim (JCA), Linton Albert (JCA)]. However, the only legal limitation that is imposed upon the plaintiff is that the secured creditor must realise the security within six months of the Winding Up order. Otherwise the rights to impose interest is curtailed in that, the secured creditor cannot enforce the rights for the interest beyond that period. In fact, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has been candid and had informed this court that the plaintiff did not claim for any interest after the order of Winding Up against the defendant.
In Re Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd (1997) 3 MLJ 435, the case referred and relied on by the Official Receiver's Office can be distinguished on the facts and the surrounding circumstances.

(i)          In that case, there was a validation order granted by a High Court pursuant to   s 292 of the  Companies Act 1965 in respect of a private sale and purchase agreement entered into between Campall, acting through its Directors and a third party which was made conditional upon the validation by the court of the said sale.
(ii)         The validation order was granted on 7.12.1993 by the court. In consequence to the validation order and the realisation of the assets of Campall, there was a dispute when it came to the distribution of the assets to all its creditors and the order of priority as provided under   s 292 of the  Companies Act.
(iii)        As a result, the Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd, applied to the court for various orders on the distributions of the assets against the liquidator. The liquidator objected to the application and had raised preliminary objection that the application was premature and that Perdana Bank's entitlement was only to the proceeds of the sale of the secured property after deducting the proper expenses and disbursement incurred. The liquidator contended that the deposit paid pursuant to the private agreement which was forfeited and interest earned were not part of the proceed of the sale of the properly and that the Perdana Bank's claim would rank pari pasu with the other creditors and that the liquidator was entitled to his remuneration as fixed by the Committee of Inspection.
(iv)        In those circumstances, and the background facts, His Lordship Abdul Malik Ishak J (now JCA) in allowing the liquidators preliminary objection and dismissing Perdana Bank's application had held that the leave was required under   S 226 (3) (a) of the  Companies Act and that the application was premature.

[16] However, as stated above, the present Originating Summons which was filed by the plaintiff-chargee is to seek an order of court to enforce the statutory right and remedy against the charge. Therefore, it is the respectful view of this court that the reasons given, the facts and the surrounding circumstances in Re Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd can be easily distinguished as summarised above and poles apart when compared to this straight forward application by the plaintiff in the present case, (see Zaitun Marketing Sdn Bhd v Boustead Eldred Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Bousted Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd) [2010] 2 MLJ 749; [2010] 3 CLJ 785 for duties of a Liquidator).
[17] Be that as it may, in any event even if leave was required which this court wishes to reiterate there is no such requirement for a secured creditor, like the plaintiff, who was only enforcing its statutory right and remedy against the property, there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining leave from the Winding Up Court after having filed this Originating Summons in court. Leave may be obtained even if proceedings had been filed or commenced and not to treat proceedings as ipso facto to nullities as proceedings began without leave are curable by later grant of leave, (see Re Saunders (a Bankrupt) Re Bearman (a Bankrupt) (1997) 3 ALL ER 992), Re Wanzer Limited (1891) 1 ChD 305 at p. 312)
"It directs what ought to be done But it does not oblige the court to close the gates of mercy upon the applicant but enables it to stay proceedings until that consent, which as a matter of duty ought to be obtained in the first instance is obtained at last" (Rendal v Blair (1890) 45 Ch D 139 at p. 158) (see also In Trusst and Guarantee Co. Ltd v Brenner (1933) SCR 656 at p. 663, Nazir Ahmad v Peoples Bank of Northern India Ltd (In Liquidation) (1942) (29) AIR (Lah) 189)

[18] S 226(3) (a) of the  Companies Act does not affect the power of any secured creditor to realise or otherwise deal with the security and the rights are protected and that there is no requirement to seek the leave of the Winding Up Court for realising the security. In other words, the secured creditor stands outside the Winding Up proceedings unless he himself chooses to submit to the jurisdiction of the Winding Up Court (see also Padmavathamma and ors v Battepati Pasthasarathi (1996) 4 Andh LT 272). A secured creditor cannot be deprived of his security until he has been paid in full, (see Re Joint Stock Discount Company, Warrant Finance Company's case No.2 (1870) 10 Equity 11, Re David Llyod and Company (1877) 6 Ch D. 339 at p. 343 as referred to in Ram Chand v Bank for Celyer India, Limited Delhi and another (1922) Lahore 281, Nrishinha Kumar Siha v Deb Prosanna Mukherjee and Ors AIR (1935) Col 460, Koshi Bai and Another v Chunilal Hathising and Orther AZR (1930) Bombay 11).
[19] As stated above, this court wishes to reiterate and is of the considered view that the S 226(3)(a) of the  Companies Act was not intended for the enforcement of a statutory right and remedy against the property charged to the plaintiff Bank as the proceeding is not against the liquidator. If s 226(3)(a) of the  Companies Act was intended to cover and is insisted upon to be applied against a secured creditor, like the plaintiff Bank, to enforce the statutory remedy on the security property, no Bank or Financial Institution may be willing to grant banking or credit facilities to their potential customers if they would also be expected to rank pari passu and be in the queue with the other creditors. Consequently, and if the plaintiff Bank had to be in the queue, and is to be repaid in accordance and rank pari passu, which in some cases may not be sufficient to satisfy the entire claim outstanding, obviously, it is not good for the country's economy and the Financial Institution. It may also adversely affect other potential customers who may be in need of financial assistance but may not able to obtain the facility until the bank had recovered the whole outstanding sum. The bank may also be reluctant to grant banking facilities even with the security as the same will frustrate the Financial Institution who may not be able to recover the entire loan or facilities granted to the customers and the possibility of the collapse of the Banking Sector cannot be ruled out and the safeguard given to a secured lender may be defeated or frustrated. It is the respected view of this court that S 226(3)(a) of the  Companies Act does not bind a secured creditor and there is no bar for a secured creditor, such as the plaintiff in the present case to enforce the statutory remedy without leave from the Winding Up Court as the plaintiff did not institute any action or suit, (see also Lim Eng Chuan Sdn Bhd v United Malayan Banking Corp & Anor (2011) 1 MLJ 486).
[20] As stated above, the only limitation that is imposed upon a secured creditor is that he must realise the security within 6 months from the date of the Winding Up order. Otherwise, the secured creditors' right to impose further interest cannot be included to the outstanding amount owing beyond the date of the Winding up order, (see s 291(1) of the  Companies Act 1965 read with s 4(1) of the  Civil Law Act 1956, S.8 (2A) and paragraph 9 of Schedule C and   s 42 of the  Bankruptcy Act 1967 (see also K. Balasubramaniam (Likuidator bagi Kosmopolitan Credit & Leasing Sdn Bhd) v MBF Finance Bhd & Ors (2005) 2 MLJ 201, followed in United Overseas Bank (M) Bhd v Andrew Lee Siew Ling (Civil Appeal No. J-02(IM)-2786-2009) (Unreported) [Coram: Jefferey Tan Kok Hua (JCA) (now FCJ), Zaharah binti Ibrahim (JCA), Linton Albert (JCA)]. At the same time, the secured creditor cannot disregard in totality the order of the Winding Up Court or the insolvency proceedings or to treat the Winding Up Order as non-existence. The statutory rights or remedy only saves the power of the secured creditor to realise his security or otherwise deal as with it to recover the outstanding sum or the banking facilities on the security, (see Padmavathamma and Ors v Batteryati Parthasarathi (1996) 4 Andh.L.T. 272).
[21] In the circumstances and for the reasons stated above, this court is of the considered view that the S 226(3)(a) of the  Companies Act has no application whatsoever to a secured creditor who has the statutory right to commence foreclosure proceeding where in the present case, the plaintiff is merely enforcing its statutory remedy..."

Malaysia-An Overview of Islamic Finance in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia (20 Dec 2012)

An Overview of Islamic Finance in Malaysia and Saudi Arabia (20 Dec 2012)








This circular may also be accessed here.





-- 

Malaysia-Dialogue Session between Bar Council and Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (“MACC”) (8 Dec 2012)

Dialogue Session between Bar Council and Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission ("MACC") (8 Dec 2012)






__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Circular No 256/2012
Dated 5 Dec 2012

To Members of the Malaysian Bar

Dialogue Session between Bar Council and Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission ("MACC") (8 Dec 2012)

Since its formation on 1 Jan 2009 to replace the Anti-Corruption Agency, the MACC has constantly found itself in the limelight.  From its investigations of high-profile corruption cases, to its handling of witnesses and suspects, questions have frequently been raised of the MACC.  In an effort to foster better understanding, the MACC and Bar Council Constitutional Law Committee are organising a dialogue session, as follows:

Date: 8 Dec 2012 (Saturday)
Time: 10:00 am to 1:00 pm (Registration will begin at 10:00 am)
Venue: Raja Aziz Addruse Auditorium, Level 1, Bar Council, 15 Leboh Pasar Besar, 50050 Kuala Lumpur

The dialogue is open to the public, and admission is free.

Members are encouraged to take this opportunity to pose questions to the MACC on their practice, procedures and any other issues relating to the agency, and to corruption in general.

Programme


10:00 am


Registration and refreshments

10:30 am

Briefing about MACC by
YBhg Dato' Shamshun Baharin b Mohd Jamil
Director, Community Education Division, MACC
 

11:00 am

Dialogue Session
(1)   Panel 1: Tuan Han Chee Rull
       Senior Deputy Director, Investigation Division, MACC
(2)   Panel 2: YBhg Tan Sri Dato' Cecil Abraham
       Member, Operations Review Panel, MACC(3)   Panel 3: YBhg Dato' Haji Abdul Razak b Musa,
       Director, Legal and Prosecution Division, MACC
(4)   Panel 4: Syahredzan b Johan
       Chairperson, Bar Council Constitutional Law Committee

Moderator: Datuk Seri Azman Ujang
Member, Consultation and Corruption Prevention Panel, MACC

   01:00 pm
   Lunch




























Syahredzan b Johan 
Chairperson
Constitutional Law Committee


This circular and the attachment may also be accessed here.





-- 

Proview eBook Bi-Weekly Offer - Get your copy at 20% off!

Proview eBook Bi-Weekly Offer - Get your copy at 20% off! ...