Monday, 3 December 2012

Malaysia-Notice for Reference Proceedings

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Selangor Bar <selangorbar@unifi.my>
Date: 3 December 2012 14:00
Subject: Notice for Reference Proceedings
To:



SBC/CIR/119/12
3rd December, 2012



REFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
A Reference will be held in respect and memory of the following departed members of the Selangor Bar :

1.Sinnu A/L Marappan
2.Ghandinesen A/L Kanapathipillai
3.Thaiyub Khan B Othuman Aliar
4.Vasuvi A/P Paramanathan
5.Chong Weng Kong


Date:14th December, 2012, Friday
Time:9.00 am
Venue: Mahkamah Tinggi NCVC (2),
Tingkat 4, Bangunan Makhamah Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Shah
Persiaran Pegawai,Seksyen 5, 40000 Shah Alam


The proceedings will be jointly presided by Yang Arif Dato' Mohamad Zabidin Bin Mohd Diah and Yang Arif Dr. Prasad Sandosham Abraham.

All members of the Bar attending the Reference Proceedings are kindly requested to inform the secretariat of their attendance by 5th December, 2012, and to be robed (i.e. open Court attire) when attending the said Reference Proceedings.

Thank you,

Ramesh Lachmanan
Chairperson
Welfare, Human Rights & Environmental Sub-Committee
Selangor Bar Committee



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Malaysia-Malaysian Bar Annual Dinner & Dance 2013 (16 Mar 2013)

Malaysian Bar Annual Dinner & Dance 2013 (16 Mar 2013)








This circular and the attachment may also be accessed here.



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Malaysia-Back-to-School Charity Drive

Back-to-School Charity Drive







This circular may also be accessed here.



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Malaysia-Press Release: Peace for All Cannot be Achieved by Denying the Rights of Some

Press Release: Peace for All Cannot be Achieved by Denying the Rights of Some






_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Press Release

Peace for All Cannot be Achieved by Denying the Rights of Some


The Malaysian Bar welcomes the reported statement by the Honourable Prime Minister Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak that "it is time for a global movement for culture of peace".  Opening the Third UMNO International Forum entitled "Conflict and Conciliation in the People's Politics — Looking Back or Looking Forward?" in conjunction with the UMNO General Assembly 2012, the Honourable Prime Minister also emphasised that we are living in a "changed world".

The Malaysian Bar firmly believes that peace for all cannot be achieved by denying the rights of some. 

In Malaysia, members of the marginalised lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and questioning ("LGBTIQ") communities have, regrettably, too often been socially condemned and scorned as "immoral", "abnormal", or "diseased", called "rejects" or "pariahs", and even referred to as being against the public interest.  Discriminatory laws have long been used (and even misused) to oppress and persecute these communities.  One such example is section 377A of the Penal Code, commonly known as the "anti-gay law" even though its provisions criminalise oral or anal intercourse, whether heterosexual or homosexual.  The authorities have regularly portrayed homosexuality negatively and as a "social ill" that must be curbed. 

The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia ("SUHAKAM") in its Annual Report 2011 made the following forceful statement:
The Commission stands firm that all people, regardless of their sexual orientation should be able to enjoy the full range of human rights without exception.  Violence, abuse and violations of the rights of the sexual minorities cannot be justified.

SUHAKAM also noted that public service messages are required to promote the rights of LGBTIQ individuals.  As discrimination of persons based on gender identity and sexual orientation is prevalent, SUHAKAM suggested that relevant laws should be reviewed and Article 8(2) of the Federal Constitution should be expanded to bar such discrimination. 

Similarly, the Malaysian Bar does not condone such a judgmental, damaging and divisive attitude and approach, which breeds prejudice and intolerance, and incites bigotry and violence against individuals who belong, or are perceived to belong, to these groups.  It is this attitude and approach that must be curbed.  Individual choice with respect to gender identity and sexual orientation must be respected.

All individuals should be treated equally, and the principle of non-discrimination must be paramount.  Discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals — who are equal citizens — is abhorrent, and must be prohibited by law.  These individuals are equal before the law.  

We note that the spread of HIV has often been erroneously and misleadingly linked to the sexual practices of LGBTIQ individuals, when it is an individual's unsafe sexual practices that increase the risk of infection. 

The Malaysian Bar calls on the Honourable Prime Minister to provide leadership in rejecting the persecution of, and discrimination against, sexual minorities.  The laws of the nation must prohibit discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any discrimination.  This would be a significant first step, and would give real meaning to the Prime Minister's call to embrace moderation and to "put…empathy and understanding into the service of facing down extremism in all its forms".  It would also reflect commitment to his words — written in an opinion piece published in the Sydney Morning Herald on 27 October 2011 — that Malaysia is a "progressive, liberal nation".

No doubt there are those amongst us who do not agree with the sexual orientations and gender identities of LGBTIQ individuals.  But it is precisely because of this that sexual minorities, and indeed other minority communities, need to be protected.  Individual freedoms and liberties mean very little if they are only extended selectively, or to those who agree with the majority view. 

Lim Chee Wee
President
Malaysian Bar
3 Dec 2012



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MALAYSIA-The winding up order should have been made even if the respondent was solvent


In the Court of Appeal case of Lafarge Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Gold Trend Builders Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 817, it was held that:-

"...[20] The winding up order should have been made even if the respondent was solvent (Cornhill Insurance plc v Improvement Services Ltd and ors [1986] 1 WLR 114, where it was held by Harman J that where a creditor's debt is clearly established, then the creditor has the right to present a winding up petition and obtain relief even though the company was solvent). 'Where the creditor's debt is clearly established it seems to me to follow that this court would not, in general, at any rate, interfere though the company would appear to be solvent ... to persist in non-payment ... would itself either suggest inability or that the application was an application that the court should give the debtor relief which it itself could provide, but would not provide, by paying the debt' (Mann v Goldstein [1968] 1 WLR 1091 per Ungoed-Thomas J). The solvency of a company counts for nothing if it is not ready, willing and able to meet the demand of the creditor. The discretion to refuse winding up could be exercised if the respondent was ready, willing and able to meet the demand of the appellant (see Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Company, Blackpool, The v Hampson, Re (1882) 23 Ch D 1; [1883] 49 LT 147, 151, where the company was solvent and the creditor accepted the proposal to pay the debt within one month, the Court of Appeal (Jessel MR, Cotton and Bowen UJ) ordered the debt to be paid within one month, in default of which 'there will be the usual winding up order'). But it was not that in the instant case..."

MALAYSIA-COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY


In the Court of Appeal case of Lafarge Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Gold Trend Builders Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 817, it was held that:-

"...[14] The respondent asserted that it had unappropriated profits of RM2,759,276 for the year ended 31 December 2006. Perhaps the finances of the respondent were in the pink of health in 2006. But the finances of the respondent must have turned for the worse in 2007, for on 20 July 2007 the respondent informed the appellant that it 'was facing, severe cash flow problems and ... [was] ... restructuring its finances' and that it could only pay RM3,701.65 to the appellant (see 55AR). So, by July 2007, the respondent could not even pay what was a paltry sum of RM37,163.95 in comparison to the alleged unappropriated profits, and was unable to meet the current demand upon it.
[15] The ability of a company to meet current demands upon it goes to the solvency or otherwise of a company. In Malayan Plant (Pte) Ltd v Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 53, the Privy Council opined that the following observations in Buckley on the Companies Act, (13th Ed), at p 460, dealing with 'commercial insolvency, that is, of the company being unable to meet current demands upon it', were impeccable:
In such a case it is useless to say that if its assets are realized there will be ample to pay twenty shillings in the pound: this is not the test. A company may be at the same time insolvent and wealthy. It may have wealth locked up in investments not presently realizable; but although this be so, yet if it have not assets available to meet its current liabilities it is commercially insolvent and may be wound up.

[16] In Hotel Royal Ltd Bhd v Tina Travel & Agencies Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 MLJ 21, Siti Norma Yaakob J, as she then was, pointed out that the scope or the meaning to be given to the phrase 'unable to pay its debts' appearing in s 218(1)(e) of the  CA  was explained by McPherson J in The Law of Company Liquidation (3rd Ed), at p 54 as follows:
The phrase 'unable to pay its debts' is susceptible to two interpretations. One meaning which may properly be attached to it is that a company is unable to pay its debts if it is shown to be financially insolvent in the sense that its liabilities exceed its assets. But to require proof of this in every case would impose upon an applicant the often impossible task of establishing the true financial position of the company, and the weight of authority undoubtedly supports the view that the primary meaning to the phrase is insolvency in the commercial sense -- that is inability to meet current demands irrespective of whether the company is possessed of assets which, if realised, would enable it to discharge its liabilities in full.

[17] 'In short, the question is not whether the debtor's assets exceed his liabilities as appeared in the books of the debtor, but whether there are moneys presently available to the debtor, or which he is able to realise in time, to meet the debts as they become due. It is not sufficient that the assets might be realisable at some future date after the debts have become due and payable' (Lian Keow Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) & anor v Overseas Credit Finance (M) Sdn Bhd [1988] 2 MLJ 449, 454, per Seah SCJ). 'The test of commercial insolvency simply means that the respondent company is unable to meet current debts as they fall due' (System Communication Engineering Sdn Bhd v Zabidin Sdn Bhd [1999] MLJU 55; [1999] 1 AMR 1187 per Abdul Malik Ishak J, as he then was). '... the test for the insolvency of the respondent does not depend on the presence of their realisable assets' (Hotel Royal Ltd Bhd v Tina Travel & Agencies Sdn Bhd).
[18] It was a bare allegation that there was a dispute. On the evidence, there was no doubt about the liability of the respondent, and there was no question or issue to be decided and or tried.
[19] The respondent who could not meet the current demand of the appellant was insolvent. The respondent produced its banking statements for the period August 2008-December 2008 (see 180-188AR) to substantiate that it was a going concern. But those banking statements only substantiated that the respondent had no funds to meet the demand of the appellant at the material time. Even when the petition was heard in 2009, there was still no evidence that the respondent had the funds and would meet the demand of the appellant. In those circumstances, the refusal of the winding up order was wholly unjust, for it altogether deprived the appellant of the remedy conferred by statute. All said, the winding up order should have been made..."

MALAYSIA-WHETHER THERE IS A BONA FIDE DISPUTE


In the Court of Appeal case of Lafarge Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Gold Trend Builders Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 817, it was held that:-

"...[5] Before us, it was again contended by the respondent that there was a bona fide dispute as to the debt. The finding of the court below was that there was a bona fide dispute as to the debt. But it was also at the same time the finding of the court below that the debt was agreed to be settled by eight instalments (see 22AR) and that the respondent had only paid three instalments (see 22AR). If that were so, then what could have been in dispute? Having regard to the clear and unequivocal admission of the debt in 59AR, was the court below entitled to come to the conclusion that there was a bona fide dispute? (see Re Sunshine Securities (Pte) Ltd; Sunshine Securities (Pte) Ltd & anor v Official Receiver and Liquidator of Mosbert Acceptance Ltd [1978] 1 MLJ 57, where it was held by the Court of Appeal of Singapore that given the clear and unequivocal admission of the debt, the trial judge was entitled to conclude that there was no bona fide dispute). Could the finding of bona fide dispute stand up to scrutiny?
[6] Before we proceed to answer those questions, we should perhaps say that a creditor is not required to obtain a judgment before serving a statutory demand ...' (The Law of Company Liquidation (4th Ed), by Andrew R Keay at p 83) and 'whether or not judgment had been obtained, an unpaid creditor is, as a general rule, entitled to a winding-up order against a company which is insolvent' (The Law of Company Liquidation (4th Ed), by Andrew R Keay at p 91). Where there is no judgment, it is not uncommon for companies to argue that the debt is disputed. But 'in order to oppose a winding up petition, the respondent must raise a bona fide dispute in both a subjective and objective sense. It must be honestly believed to exist and must be based on substantial or reasonable grounds -- BMC Construction Sdn Bhd v Dataran Rentas Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 MLJ 356 ' (Chan & Koh on Malaysian Company Law (2nd Ed), at para 22.145).
[7] In BMC Construction Sdn Bhd v Dataran Rentas Sdn Bhd, the respondent opposed the winding up petition on the ground that it had a cross-claim or set-off against the petitioner for defective works. The respondent also produced letters from its bankers to substantiate that it was solvent and had the means to settle the claim of the petitioner. On what constitutes a bona fide dispute, the court first surveyed the law and then summarised it as follows:
The respondent's point of view is that a dispute automatically arises whenever there are opposing assertions. Perhaps it is true, that whenever there are opposing assertions, there is no agreement on the matters diametrically asserted. Perhaps, in that sense of argument, debate or controversy, it is true that there is dispute whenever there are opposing assertions. But it is patently not true that a bona fide dispute automatically arises whenever there are opposing assertions. For whether or not there is a bona fide dispute wholly depends upon the evidence (see Chip Yew Brick Works Sdn Bhd v Chang Heer Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 CLJ 5). 'The debt must be disputed on some substantial grounds' (Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lian Seng Properties Sdn Bhd [1986] 2 MLJ 374, 376; [1991] 1 CLJ 260; [1991] 1 CLJ 317 (Rep) [1991] 1 MLJ 95, 97 per Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ). The facts must indicate that there is a substantial dispute (Re Nima Travel Sdn Bhd). '... it is not sufficient ... to say 'we dispute the claim'. (The respondent) must bring forward a prima facie case which satisfies the court that there is something to be tried, either before the court itself, or in an action, or by some other proceeding' (Re Great Britain Mutual Life Assurance Society [1880] 16 Ch D 246, 253 per Jessel MR). 'Dispute means not just differences arising out of a party's refusal to do something but controversy over contestable matters. Mere refusal to pay is not a dispute. See the cases of Elf Petroleum SE Asia Pte Ltd v Winelf Petroleum Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 177; [1984] 1 LNS 166 andKSM Insurance v Ong Ah Ba & Anor [1986] 1 MLJ 237; [1984] 1 LNS 147, both decisions by George J, (as he then was)' (Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Perak v Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 CLJ 2400, ; [1991] 1 CLJ 362 (Rep), per Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ, and cited inTan Kok Cheng & Sons Realty Co Sdn Bhd v Urn Ah Pat [1996] 1 CLJ 231, 236). 'The dispute must be bona fide in both a subjective and objective sense. Thus it must be honestly believed to exist and must be based on substantial or reasonable grounds. Substantial means having substance and not frivolous and which the court should therefore ignore' (Palmer's Company Law (23th Ed), p 1117; see also Salak Park Development Sdn Bhd v Fajar Menyensing Sdn Bhd [1994] 4 CLJ 580). To just say 'we dispute the claim', is most definitely not enough.

[8] 'Obviously a bare allegation by the company that a dispute exists cannot be allowed to deprive a creditor of the remedy which the statute confers on her or him ... It is, of course, impossible to predict in advance precisely what will constitute a 'substantial' ground but a suggested test is that there must be 'so much doubt and question about the liability to pay the debt as that the court see there is a question to be decided' or in the words of Sir George Jessel, the duty of a company to 'bring forward a prima facie case which satisfies the court that there is something to be tried' ... Whether there is in fact ground for the dispute depends upon the evidence ...' (The Law of Company Liquidation (4th Ed), by Andrew R Keay at p 99). 'Where there is a bona fide dispute as to the debt, the company cannot be said to have neglected to pay on a statutory notice' (Palmer's Company Law (23rd Ed), at p 1117), and a petition based on a debt which is disputed on substantial grounds will fail (see Kumagai Gumi Co Ltd v Zenecon-Kumagai Sdn Bhd & ors and another application [1994] 2 MLJ 789). 'Where the company disputes the debt in good faith and on reasonable grounds, the court will not make a winding up order ... [However] It is not satisfactory for the company simply to claim that it has a defence to the creditor's claim; it must show that it has a viable defence in law and produce prima facie proof of the facts to which it relies ... If there is no genuine dispute the court will make an order' (Corporate Insolvency, Law and Practice (2nd Ed), by Bailey, Groves and Smith at p 7.97).
[9] The making of a winding up order is not entirely a discretionary matter once a debt is established and not satisfied. 'One does not like to say positively that no case could occur in which it would be right to refuse it, but ordinarily speaking, it is the duty of the court to direct a winding up' (Bowes v Hope Life Insurance Society Ltd (1865) 11 HLC 389 per Lord Cranworth). There is however authority for the proposition that Lord Cranworth's principle had been too widely stated (see The Law of Company Liquidation (4th Ed), by Andrew R Keay at p 92). Since our s 218 provides that the court 'may order a winding up of a company', the discretion whether to make an order for winding up lies with the court. Such discretion is however not unbridled. In Genting Sanyen Industrial Paper Sdn Bhd v WWL Corrugators Sdn Bhd [2000] 5 MLJ 33; [2000] 1 CLJ 27, Clement Skinner JC, as he then was, balanced the two sides as follows:
The submission that there is an overriding discretion reposed in the court is well supported by authority because whilst it is accepted that as between a creditor and a company as his debtor, the creditor who proves insolvency is prima facie entitled to a winding-up order, (see the judgment of Buckley J at p 331 in Re Crigglestone Coal Co Ltd [1906] 2 Ch 327) there are numerous cases, both local and Commonwealth, in which the overriding discretion of the court to refuse a winding up is recognised, (see Kim Wah Theatre Sdn Bhd v Fuhlum Development Sdn Bhd [1990] 2 MLJ 511; Cetico Sdn Bhd v The Tropical Veneer Co Bhd [1987] CLJ 511; Re P & J Macrae Ltd [1961] 1 All ER 302).
However ... the overriding discretion of the court, like any other judicial discretion, is fairly strictly regulated and is exercised in accordance with principles that are well defined. Counsel referred to The Law of Company Liquidation, (3rd Ed), by J O' Donovan at p 61 where the author discusses the discretion of the court in these terms:

Its power to refuse an order is, however, fairly strictly regulated and is exercised in accordance with principles that are relatively well defined. There are, in fact, certainly no more than five, and probably only four, reasons which will justify the court in refusing to make an order on the application of an unpaid creditor.
These are (1) the applicant's debt amounts to less than $1,000; (2) the debt is bona fide disputed by the company; (3) the company has paid or tendered payment of applicant's debt; (4) winding-up is opposed by other creditors;.


[10] In its affidavit affirmed on 31 December 2008 (see 127-132AR), the respondent contended (i) that the respondent was not indebted to the appellant in the sum of RM43,876.66 (see 128AR at para 5), (ii) that the s 218 notice was premature by reason of the settlement which gave eight months to the respondent to settle the debt of RM53,701.65 (see 128AR at para 6), (iii) that the respondent had paid three instalments of RM6,712.71 (see 128-129AR, at paras 7-9), (iv) that there was no notice of termination of the settlement (see 129AR at para 10), (v) that the appellant readily accepted the third instalment after issuance of the s 218 notice (see 129AR at para 11), (v) that the s 218 notice was therefore bad and could not terminate the settlement (see 129AR at para 12), and (vi) that the amount of debt as stated in the petition was wrong and therefore had no legal effect (see 129AR at para 13). And on the matter of its solvency, the respondent contended that it had unappropriated profits of RM2,759,276 for the year ended 31 December 2006 (see 132AR at para 26).
[11] But with respect, we do not see how the respondent, by that affidavit, could have raised a doubt or question on the liability of the respondent to the appellant. If at all, the respondent only confirmed that the debt was true and due. To take it from the start, at 128AR and 130AR (paras 6 and 14), the respondent admitted that the total debt was RM53,701.65 (RM50,000 plus RM3,701.65). At 128-129AR (paras 7-9), the respondent admitted that only three instalments (a total of RM20,138.13) had been paid. In other words, the respondent admitted that five instalments had not been paid. And at 129AR (para 11), the respondent admitted that the third instalment was only paid after issuance of the s 218 notice. When it was issued, the petition stated that the outstanding debt was RM36,574.58 for goods sold and delivered, and RM7,302.08 for accrued interest, as it stood at 3 April 2007. But by affidavit dated 17 October 2008, the petition was corrected to reflect the payment of the third instalment which had reduced the outstanding debt from RM36,574.58-RM29,861.87 for goods sold and delivered (see 126AR). After the correction, the petition only claimed RM29,861.87 for goods and sold and delivered. And that debt for goods sold and delivered could not be disputed. The respondent admitted that the principal sum was RM50,000. Payment of three instalments (or RM20,138.13) left a balance of RM29,861.87, which was the exact sum claimed for goods and sold and delivered. The other claim was for RM7,302.08, for interest accrued up till 3 April 2008. The total claim of the appellant was therefore made up of RM29,861.87, which could not be disputed, and RM7,302.08, which as the agreed interest could also not be disputed. The total claim was for RM37,163.95. There was simply no basis to say that the appellant claimed RM43,876.66. Based on admitted sums and figures, the ultimate sum of RM37,163.95 was true and correct. There was no bona fide dispute as to that debt. It could not be to the contrary. The three instalments were fully credited. The claimed interest was for that period up till 3 April 2008. Since interest was not claimed for the period after 3 April 2008, it was absurd to argue that the payment of the third instalment on 20 August 2008 affected the computation of the interest.
[12] There was also no question that the debt of RM37,163.95 was due, albeit that the settlement gave eight months to the respondent to settle the debt. The first instalment fell due in July 2007 and the eighth and last instalment fell due in February 2008. Hence, by the time the appellant issued the s 218 notice in April 2008, all instalments were already overdue, by reason of the effluxion of time and not by reason of any default of payment of any one instalment. With respect, the issue of prior termination of the settlement was an absolute red herring. The time granted by the appellant for payment by instalments had passed. And when that had passed, the appellant was more than entitled to issue the s 218 notice in April 2008, to demand for payment of the then six overdue instalments and agreed interest. Acceptance of the third instalment after issuance of the s 218 notice was of no consequence, as the correct amount was claimed. If at all, the payment of only the third instalment but not the entire debt proved that the respondent was unable to pay its debt to the appellant.
[13] The appellant's demand for payment of a sum that far exceeded RM500 was not met within three weeks (see YPJE Consultancy Service Sdn Bhd v Heller Factoring (M) Sdn Bhd (fomerly known as Matang Factoring Sdn Bhd) [1996] 2 MLJ 482; [1996] 3 CLJ 51,60). There was no legitimate reason for the respondent to withhold payment. The requirements of  s 218(2)(a) of the  CA  had been met. Pursuant to  s 218(2)(a) of the  CA, the respondent 'shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts'. ' ... the presumption of insolvency ... arises if the requirements of the section relating to the demand have been complied with' (Sri Hartamas Development Sdn Bhd v MBf Finance Bhd [1992] 1 MLJ 313; [1992] 1 CLJ 637; [1992] 1 CLJ 303 (Rep) per Gunn Chit Tuan SCJ, as he then was). Without any bona fide dispute, 'it is for the respondent to prove that it is able to pay its debts' (Sri Hartamas at p 641)...."

Malaysia-Seminar on An Overview of the Recent Developments in Malaysian Intellectual Property Law (17 Jan 2012)

Seminar on An Overview of the Recent Developments in Malaysian Intellectual Property Law (17 Jan 2012)







This circular may also be accessed here.




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Malaysia-Dinner in Honour of the Elevation of The Right Honourable Tun Arifin Zakaria as Chief Justice of the Federal Court (14 Dec 2012)

Dinner in Honour of the Elevation of The Right Honourable Tun Arifin Zakaria as Chief Justice of the Federal Court (14 Dec 2012)





To Members of the Malaysian Bar

Dinner in Honour of the Elevation of The Right Honourable Tun Arifin Zakaria as Chief Justice of the Federal Court

In honour of the elevation of The Right Honourable Tun Arifin Zakaria as Chief Justice of the Federal Court, The Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn Alumni Association, Malaysia, will host a dinner, as follows:

Date: 14 Dec 2012 (Friday)
Time:               7:30 pm
Venue: Grand Ballroom, Hilton Kuala Lumpur Hotel
Dress code: Dark lounge suit (men)
          Formal (women)

Dinner tickets are priced at RM200 each, or RM2,000 for a table of 10 guests.

All payments are to be made by cheque to "The Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn Alumni Association, Malaysia".

Please direct any enquiries on the event (including information regarding dietary preferences) to Bharti Seth, the Organising Chairperson, who can be contacted at:

Tel: 03-2282 5530
Fax: 03-2282 5526
Address: Messrs Bharti Seth & Assoc
                A-16-3A, Level 16
                Menara UOA Bangsar
                No 5, Jalan Bangsar Utama 1
                59000 Kuala Lumpur

Thank you.

Silva Velu
Assistant Secretary
The Honourable Society of Lincoln's Inn Alumni Association, Malaysia




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Proview eBook Bi-Weekly Offer - Get your copy at 20% off!

Proview eBook Bi-Weekly Offer - Get your copy at 20% off! ...