Sunday, 28 November 2010
ORANG ASLI, RELIGION
AND MAJLIS DAERAH
In the High Court case of Pedik bin Busu dan lain-lain lwn Yang Dipertua Majlis Daerah Gua Musang dan lain-lain  5 MLJ 849, it was held as follows:-
" Di antara alasan utama permohonan mereka ialah:
(a) Plaintif-plaintif mempunyai tanah adat di Kg Jias.
(b) Mereka telah membina sebuah bangunan untuk tujuan rumah ibadat bagi penduduk yang beragama Kristian.
(c) Pada 11 April 2007, defendan kedua menghantar notis kepada mereka supaya menghentikan pembinaan rumah ibadat itu dan seterusnya merobohkannya dalam tempoh dua minggu (rujuk eksh P2 kandungan 2).
(d) Pada 19 April 2007 dan 24 Mei 2007, mereka menerima dua notis lagi daripada defendan pertama supaya merobohkan bangunan itu dalam tempoh 30 hari (rujuk eksh P3 kandungan 2).
(e) Pada 4 Jun 2007 lebih kurang jam 10 pagi seramai lebih kurang 20 orang kakitangan defendan pertama yang disertai oleh anggota polis dan RELA telah merobohkan bangunan rumah ibadat itu (rujuk gambar-gambar eksh P6 kandungan 2).
(f) Plaintif membuat laporan polis (rujuk eksh P5 kandungan 2).
(g) Tindakan defendan-defendan itu bercanggah dengan peruntukan Perlembagaan
" Defendan pertama memfailkan afidavit jawapan kandungan 5 membantah kandungan 1. Di antara alasan bantahan ialah:
(a) Tindakan kakitangan defendan pertama adalah sah.
(b) Bangunan rumah ibadat itu didirikan bertentangan dengan peruntukan Akta Jalan, Parit dan Bangunan 1974 kerana ianya tidak mendapat kelulusan daripada defendan pertama selaku pihak berkuasa tempatan yang mempunyai autoriti...."
"...ISU-ISU YANG PERLU DIPUTUSKAN
(a) Sama ada pihak berkuasa tempatan atau negeri mempunyai kuasa yang sah merobohkan bangunan rumah ibadat itu?
(b) Sama ada binaan rumah ibadat itu termasuk dalam hak-hak adat dan budaya orang asli?
(c) Sama ada binaan rumah ibadat itu dibenarkan di bawah peruntukan undang-undang yang sedia ada?
(d) Sama ada Akta Jalan, Parit dan Bangunan 1974 dan Kanun Tanah Negara terpakai kepada tanah orang-orang asli?
(e) Sama ada defendan-defendan mematuhi notis-notis yang diberikan kepada plaintif-plaintif?"
" Mengenai isu pertama, s 1(6) Akta Jalan, Parit dan Bangunan 1974 membenarkan pihak berkuasa tempatan seperti defendan pertama menyelia dan memantau tanah orang asli jika kawasan itu diwartakan. Defendan ketiga telah mewartakan Mukim Ulu Nenggiri dalam kawasan seliaan defendan pertama melalui
Warta Kn PU 956 bertarikh 15 September 2005 berkuat kuasa 1 September 2005. Pemakaian Akta Jalan, Parit dan Bangunan 1974 adalah menyeluruh dan mengatasi Akta Orang Asli. Ini bererti defendan pertama mempunyai kuasa merobohkan sesuatu bangunan yang dibina dalam bidang kuasanya jika bangunan itu tidak mematuhi keperluan yang ditetapkan oleh undang-undang."
" Mengenai isu kedua, rumah ibadat tidak termasuk dalam hak adat dan budaya orang asli kerana memeluk agama Kristian adalah amalan baru dan bukan amalan turun temurun nenek moyang mereka. Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v Adong bin Kuwau & Ors  2 MLJ 158;  2
CLJ 665 memutuskan bahawa:
the aboriginal peoples' rights over the land include the right to move freely about their land, without any form of disturbance or interference and also to live from the produce of the land itself, but not to the land itself in the modern sense that the aborigines can convey, lease out, rent out the land or any produce therein since they have been in continuous and unbroken occupation and/or enjoyment of the rights of the land from time immemorial."
" Keputusan ini disahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan (rujuk keputusan kes Mahkamah Rayuan Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v Adong bin Kuwau & Ors  2 MLJ 158;  2
" Mengenai isu ketiga, pembinaan rumah ibadat adalah dibenarkan di bawah undang-undang, namun ia perlu mematuhi peruntukan undang-undang yang sedia ada. Perkara 11(3)(c) Perlembagaan Persekutuan memperuntukkan dengan jelas bahawa:
Every religious group has the right:
a to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law."
" Namun dalam kes ini plaintif-plaintif tidak membuat permohonan untuk kelulusan pembinaan bangunan tersebut."
" Mengenai isu ke empat, adalah jelas menurut s 5 KTN bahawa tanah-tanah masih tanah kerajaan. Hak milik tanah itu masih belum diberikan atau dikeluarkan kepada plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif-plaintif tidak mengemukakan bukti yang tanah itu dikeluarkan hak milik kepada mereka. Keputusan kes Mahkamah Rayuan Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v Sagong Tasi & Ors  6 MLJ 289;  4
CLJ 169 memutuskan bahawa KTN tidak terpakai ke atas tanah adat orang asli berdasarkan s 4(2)(a) KTN. Isunya ialah adakah hartanah yang dipertikaikan itu tanah adat orang asli? Jawapannya tidak. Kawasan itu masih tanah RPS (Rancangan Penempatan Semula) yang belum diberi hak milik. Ia bukan tanah adat. Namun begitu Akta Jalan, Parit dan Bangunan 1974 adalah terpakai kepada tanah yang dipertikaikan dalam kes ini seperti yang dijelaskan dalam isu pertama di atas."
" Mengenai isu kelima, mahkamah mendapati defendan pertama tidak mematuhi notis-notis yang diberikan mereka (eksh P3). Mereka tidak menunggu tempoh masa 30 hari yang diberikan kepada plaintif-plaintif dalam notis-notis itu tetapi sebaliknya merobohkan bangunan rumah ibadat itu sebelum tempoh notis tamat. Pada hemat mahkamah, ini tidak wajar dilakukan. Jika notis diberi dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan, notis itu hendaklah dilaksanakan dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan seandainya plaintif-plaintif tidak mematuhi notis yang diarahkan. Menurut notis (eksh P2), defendan kedua mengarahkan plaintif-plaintif merobohkan rumah ibadat itu dalam tempoh dua minggu dari tarikh notis
11 April 2007. Namun terdapat juga dua notis lagi (eksh P3) yang memberi tempoh 30 hari, dan defendan pertama bertindak bersama dengan defendan kedua, maka adalah wajar, 'benefit' notis 30 hari diberikan kepada plaintif-plaintif. Hak plaintif-plaintif sepatutnya dihormati...."
" Berdasarkan kepada perenggan 6-12 di atas, mahkamah memberi perintah seperti berikut:
(a) Pemilikan tanah plaintif-plaintif dalam hartanah itu sah, walaupun hartanah itu bukan tanah adat dan belum dikeluarkan hak milik kepada mereka.
(b) Mereka berhak mengamalkan agama pilihan mereka. Mereka juga boleh membina rumah ibadat mereka walau pun ia bukan hak adat dan budaya mereka, namun ia hendaklah mematuhi kehendak undang-undang khusus Akta Jalan, Parit dan Bangunan 1974 memandangkan kawasan tanah mereka itu telah diwartakan oleh Kn PU 956 dan ditetapkan di bawah penyeliaan Majlis Daerah Gua Musang. Permohonan membina bangunan rumah ibadat itu hendaklah dikemukakan kepada defendan pertama. Oleh kerana Akta tersebut tidak dipatuhi, pembinaan rumah ibadat itu adalah tidak sah.
(c) Notis di bawah s 425 KTN boleh dikeluarkan oleh defendan kedua. Ia sah. Namun, terdapat dua lagi notis yang dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama yang memberi tempoh 30 hari, eksh P3, maka notis-notis P3 ini hendaklah dibaca bersama dengan eksh P2. Tempoh 30 hari patut diikuti.
(d) Notis yang tepat di bawah s 72(6) juga boleh dikeluarkan oleh defendan pertama tetapi defendan pertama sendiri tidak mematuhi tempoh notis 30 hari yang diberi.
(g) Prayer 5, perobohan rumah ibadat itu tidak wajar dilakukan sebelum tempoh 30 hari tamat. Defendan pertama dan kedua sepatutnya meroboh rumah ibadat itu selepas notis 30 hari tamat sekiranya plaintif-plaintif masih gagal mematuhi peruntukan undang-undang tersebut....
(h) Tindakan defendan pertama dan kedua adalah tidak mematuhi peruntukan notis yang dikeluarkan oleh mereka sendiri, mahkamah ini memerintahkan defendan pertama, kedua dan ketiga membayar ganti rugi kepada plaintif-plaintif dengan kos. Kerugian hendaklah ditaksirkan. Mahkamah juga mengawardkan ganti rugi teladan berdasarkan kepada keputusan kes Mahkamah Rayuan Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v Sagong bin Tasi & Ors  6 MLJ 289;  5
AMR 629. Ganti rugi itu hendaklah ditaksirkan."
In the Court of Appeal case of Dr Bernadine Malini Martin v
MPH Magazine Sdn Bhd & Ors and another appeal  5 MLJ 755, it was held that:-
" Our decision on the appeal in respect of the order on costs are as follows: We agree that the general principle envisaged by the rules is for costs to follow the event; that the successful party is entitled to be paid his costs except when it appears to the court that, in the circumstances of the case, some other orders should be made. We accept the proposition that an order can be reviewed on the judge's own motion or on the application of a party until such time as the order has been perfected. The judge retains control over the case until the order giving effect to his judgment is formally completed (see Chee Kuan Cheng v Chuo Kong Kah  2 MLJ 74 at p 75 (FC); Seong Fatt Sawmills Sdn Bhd v Dunlop
Industries Sdn Bhd  1 MLJ 286 at p 292)." Malaysia
" An appellate court seldom interfere in the question of costs, and if they do so, it is done reluctantly. This is because the court below has an absolute discretion except that that discretion must be exercised judicially. Wee Chong Jin CJ in KE Hilborne v Tan Tiang Quee  2 MLJ 94 said:
It has long been well settled that costs are in the discretion of the court. It has also long been well settled that an appellate tribunal is not entitled to interfere with a discretion exercised by a lower court unless it is clearly shown that the discretion has been exercised on wrong principles ..."
" In the present case the learned judge in refusing costs to the first and second defendants held:
In my judgment, in the present case, on the issue of costs, there are special grounds connected with the cause of action. The cause of action concerned the unauthorised publication of the plaintiff's photograph in a magazine meant for public circulation. To my mind, it was unethical and morally wrong for the first and second defendants to have published the plaintiff's photograph for the purpose of their commercial promotion without her consent. It was unwarranted invasion of the plaintiff's privacy. It is unfortunate for the plaintiff, that the law of this country, as it stands presently, does not make an invasion of privacy an actionable wrongdoing (it is actionable under the law of some other jurisdictions, for example, in the United States)..."
Proceedings Against The Government For Damages
In the Court of Appeal case of Government of the State of
v Syarikat Raspand (suing as a firm)  5 MLJ 717, it was held as follows:- Sabah
" In our view, r 18(2) has given due recognition to the common law position concerning the powers of the Court (of Appeal) to permit or reject the relevant grounds which are neither raised in the High Court nor included in the memorandum of appeal. These new grounds of appeal may be allowed to be argued and hence provide the foundation for consideration and determination by the Court of Appeal. At this juncture, it is appropriate for us to analyse the common law position."
" In the instant appeal, an important issue of jurisdiction (as shall be seen later in this judgment) was raised for the defendant under this head. We would apply the exceptions which were set out in the respective judgments of Lord Parker and Lord Wrenbury in Bank of Banbury, and neatly crystallised by MacIntyre J (as he then was) in Yong Mok Hin, and also the 'interest of justice' approach taken by this court in the plethora of authorities in interpreting r 18(2). Having regard to the justice of this particular case, we do not think that we should shut our mind to this issue by excluding arguments to be advanced by the defendant. We therefore answered the above question in the affirmative and allowed this issue to be ventilated by the parties herein."
" Section 6 expressly prohibits the bringing of any proceedings against the government for damages under s 5 unless the action for such wrongful act, neglect or default would have lain against the officer personally. This is a substantive provision that goes to the jurisdiction of the court. Liability can only be attributed to the government where the officer's act, neglect or default is proved to have established the liability of the officer personally. In the absence of the officer's liability, (which can only arise and bind the officer(s) if and when the officer or officers are cited as defendants), no proceedings shall lie against the government. Where no such proceedings could lie against the government, the court is in no position to exercise any jurisdiction in relation thereto."
" Reverting to the instant appeal, we note that the alleged tortfeasors viz the government servants or officers had not been stated as defendants. This omission on the part of the plaintiff has resulted in the failure to satisfy the requirements of ss 5 and 6. That being the position, no proceedings shall lie against the government ie the defendant herein, and consequentially, the High Court could not exercise jurisdiction in relation thereto."
" As illustrated above, it is trite law that the burden of proof is cast on the plaintiff to establish that the seizure of the logs was made without reasonable or probable cause. This action is tort-based, premised on the seizure made by an individual(s). The Government of the State of
(ie the defendant herein) is not an individual and is incapable of making the seizure. Hence, the singular significance in naming the alleged tortfeasor(s) as defendant(s). Since the alleged tortfeasors are not cited as defendants, no liability can be attributed to them. As the Government of the State of Sabah is incapable of making the seizure, no liability can be attached to it either. That being the case, the plaintiff could not be said to have discharged the burden of proving that the seizure of the logs had been made by the defendant without reasonable or probable cause. Consequently, there can be no question of calling for rebuttal from the defendant." Sabah
" The non-citation of the alleged tortfeasors ie the officers as the defendants herein is again fatal to the plaintiff's case in so far as s 40 is concerned. Our interpretation of s 37A applies with necessary modifications to s 40 also. The plaintiff has therefore failed to discharge the burden of proving the tort-based elements viz a malicious, fraudulent or grossly negligent act of the officers set out in s 40."
In Dr Chan Choo Lip v Malaysian Medical Council, Ministry of Health Malaysia & Anor -  6 MLJ 574, it was held at paragraphs , , to  as follows:-
" Based on these authorities, I am satisfied that the acquittal by the sessions court of the applicant is not a bar to the disciplinary proceedings intended to be initiated against him. There is therefore no decision which is adverse to him which needs to be further examined and argued. On the same reasonings, the applicant lacks the locus standi to make this leave application and it must be refused."
" The Medical Act is designed to regulate the conduct and practice of its member. The medical profession being a professional body is required to maintain a high standard of practice, ethics and discipline for the protection of the public that it serves. The Medical council is therefore entitled to enforce the rules regulating the conduct and practice of its members in the interest of not just its members but the public as well. Thus, the acquittal or conviction of any of its member in the court of law for criminal offences should not, given their supervisory and regulatory task, be binding on the council."
" In this regard, the respondents' Code of Criminal Conduct under the title 'Convictions In A Court of Law' is pertinent and it provides as follows:
In considering convictions the Council is bound to accept the determination of any court of law as conclusive evidence that the practitioner was guilty of the offence of which he was convicted Practitioners who face a criminal charge should remember this if they are advised to plead guilty, or not to appeal against a conviction merely to avoid publicity or a severe sentence. It is not open to a practitioner who has been convicted of an offence to argue before the Preliminary Investigation Committee, or the Malaysian Medical Council that he was in fact innocent. It is therefore unwise for a practitioner to plead guilty in a court of law to a charge to which he believes that the has a defence. (Emphasis added.)"
 As rightly pointed out by the respondents' counsel, only convictions by the court are binding on the council but not acquittals and the reason is obvious. When a conviction is entered, there must already be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the offence alleged but an acquittal can be had for a myriad of reasons both technical and substantive. Thus the rationale behind the council's power to further enquire into the alleged misconduct of its member, despite the acquittals. The above represent my own view, of course, but in coming to it, I am enlightened by the quotation made in the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain's case from the decision of Viscount Simonds in Simpson v General Medical Council  NZLR 271 (PC) The Times, November 9, 1955 in which His Lordship said this:
The Medical Acts are designed at the same time to protect the public and to maintain the high professional and ethical standards of an honourable calling. If a practitioner, having committed the grave offences of which the appellant has been guilty, can upon such a plea successfully resist the charge of infamous conduct and the erasure of his name from the register, the public will lack their proper protection and the honour of the profession may be endangered by the continued practices of one who can still claim to be of their number...."
ROLE OF LIQUIDATORS
In the Court of Appeal case of Dato' See Teow Chuan & Ors v Ooi Woon Chee & Ors (including Can-One International Sdn Bhd as 15th respondent) and other appeals  6 MLJ 459, it was held as follows:-
" It is our judgment that when a direction is given by the court, it is more than an advice. It is a judgment or an order and it is certainly appealable. The liquidator's discretion must take a back seat once the court gives its direction and the liquidator has no choice but to obey. The liquidator is bound to act in the way in which the court has so directed because that direction is a judgment or an order emanating from the court and it is appealable."
" We say that the orders of the learned JC cannot be construed as an 'advice'. It was an order by the learned JC and there was no discretion accorded to the liquidators."
" With the exception of the case of In re XY & Co which dealt with the previous s 67(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, all the other cases relied upon by the liquidators did not touch on that section of the law. They can readily be distinguished on the facts. Here, in the present appeal, the learned JC made specific orders and determined the rights and liabilities of the parties before the court. We hold that those orders of the learned JC are certainly appealable."
" On the facts, it is our judgment that the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick could have breached their fiduciary duties owed to the appellants. We now set out the particulars of the fiduciary duties breached by the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick:
(a) The liquidators, being officers of the court, entrusted to safeguard the reputation of the court and owing fiduciary duties to the appellants were required to act with complete impartiality, independence and transparency in conducting and discharging their duties.
(b) The liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick, could not act in breach of their fiduciary duties or in conflict of interests.
(c) KPMG Peat Marwick, in which the liquidators are the partners, are the auditors acting for and on behalf of Can-One International to whom the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick awarded the successful bid to purchase the KJCFB shares and its parent company, Can-One Bhd.
(d) KPMG Peat Marwick were the reporting accountants for Can-One International's parent company, Can-One Bhd, in respect of its public listing exercise on the main board of
Bursa . The liquidators are the partners of KPMG Peat Marwick. Malaysia
(e) KPMG Peat Marwick, in which the liquidators are the partners, received and still continue to receive financial remuneration from Can-One International and its parent company, Can-One Bhd, in respect of the auditing and/or accounting services rendered by KPMG Peat Marwick to Can-One International and Can-One Bhd. So the liquidators as partners of KPMG Peat Marwick receive pecuniary benefit from Can-One International and Can-One Bhd by virtue of Can-One International and Can-One Bhd being the clients of KPMG Peat Marwick as alluded to above.
(f) The liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick as trustees and agents of the company and/or the contributories of the company are required to act in the best interests of the company as well as for the appellants who are the contributories in respect of the proposed sale of the KJCFB shares.
(g) The liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick were custodians of the interest of the company and the appellants as the contributories on the one hand and the interest of Can-One International and Can-One Bhd on the other hand.
(h) The liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick had only themselves to be blamed for being in a position of possible conflict of interest where their confidence, trust and loyalty to Can-One International and Can-One Bhd from whom they have received and continue to receive pecuniary benefits could conflict with their duties as officers of the court and/or their duties owed to the appellants as the contributories and/or the company as alluded to above, for which the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick also received and continued to receive financial remuneration.
(i) On the facts, it remained to be answered as to whether the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick had suppressed and concealed their conflict of interest.
(j) Because of the possible conflict of interest of the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick as alluded to above and the failure to fully disclose the conflict of interest to the appellants as the contributories, it could be asked as to whether the entire public tender process for the sale of the KJCFB shares and the subsequent award of the bid to Can-One International is tainted and infected with the conflict of interest element and it is biased, illegal, null and void.
(k) From the facts, it could not be ruled out that the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick had acted in conflict of interest for their own benefit and for the benefit of their existing clients, Can-One International and its parent company, Can-One Bhd."
" The available affidavit evidence shows that both the liquidators and Can-One International admitted that:
(a) The liquidators are the partners of KPMG Peat Marwick and that KPMG Peat Marwick are the auditors and/or the reporting accountants to Can-One International and Can-One Bhd.
(b) KPMG Peat Marwick are still continuing as the auditors for Can-One International and Can-One Bhd. There was and there still is an existing auditor-client relationship between KPMG Peat Marwick and Can-One International and Can-One Bhd.
(c) KPMG Peat Marwick are paid auditing fees by Can-One International and Can-One Bhd. Thus, there is a direct pecuniary relationship between KPMG Peat Marwick and Can-One International and Can-One Bhd. And however small or nominal the financial remuneration, that raises the question of the disqualification of the liquidators to determine on the fate of the bid of their client.
(d) Can-One International admitted that KPMG Peat Marwick receives from Can-One International the annual fees of RM1,000 per year for audit work performed by KPMG Peat Marwick.
(e) Can-One Bhd also admitted that it had paid to KPMG Peat Marwick the sum of RM18,000 and RM17,000 respectively for the financial years 2007 and 2008 for audit work performed by KPMG Peat Marwick.
(f) Without a doubt, there was the possibility of a conflict of interest situation that cannot be swept under the carpet."
" We must highlight that the appellants had deposed in their affidavit affirmed on
15 June 2009, the material facts involving the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick in the entire liquidation exercise of the company. We say that these material facts were unrebutted. Briefly, we will summarise them as follows:
(a) It was the contributories who first recommended KPMG Peat Marwick because at the time of the recommendation there was no conflict of interest.
(b) The contributories did not know about the liquidators at all. They were only dealing with KPMG Peat Marwick. It was KPMG Peat Marwick who nominated and put in their men as the liquidators because the liquidators were partners of KPMG Peat Marwick and KCSSB.
(c) It must be recalled that the High Court order appointing the liquidators and the subsequent order appointing the replacement liquidator made specific reference to KPMG Peat Marwick and KCSSB.
(d) And the correspondence by the liquidators on their appointment on
30 January 1996 with the directors of the company and/or the contributories was under the letterhead of KPMG Peat Marwick.
(e) The liquidators proceeded to distribute their business calling cards bearing the name of KPMG Peat Marwick.
(f) In the course of their work, the liquidators delegated various tasks and duties to the employees of KPMG Peat Marwick and/or KCSSB.
(g) Of significance is this. That all payments and advances for the liquidators' services were paid to KPMG Peat Marwick or KCSSB.
(h) All advertisements inserted by the liquidators, prominently and publicly displayed the names of KPMG Peat Marwick and/or KCSSB.
(i) All meetings except the two private and secret meetings were held at the office of KPMG Peat Marwick.
(j) The liquidators' statutory reports were filed by KCSSB.
(k) The liquidators had announced and made it loud and clear to all the contributories that they were not acting alone and that they were supported by various team members of KPMG Peat Marwick in the liquidation process of the company.
(l) That both KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick are the corporate vehicles and/or entities used by the liquidators in carrying out their obligations and duties as the liquidators of the company."
" As demonstrated above, the liquidators, KCSSB and KPMG Peat Marwick are inextricably linked, intertwined, and involved in the entire liquidation process of the company."
" As officers of the court, the liquidators are not above the law and must uphold the integrity and sanctity and transparency of the open public tender exercise which is a judicial sale. The judicial sale must be seen to be impartial and above board. Serious questions have been raised which must be investigated and answered."
IS THE FEDERAL COURT BOUND BY ITS OWN DECISIONS?
In the Federal Court case of Gnanasekaran a/l Krishnasamy v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Awam, Malaysia & Anor  6 MLJ 441, it was held at paragraph  that:-
"...After all this court is not necessarily bound by its own earlier decision and may depart from it where necessary (see Tan Ying Hong v Tan Sian San & Ors  2 MLJ 1 pp 431-432 2
CLJ 269 439-440)...."
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